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ABSTRACT

RISK AND VISIBILITY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
BY
HUNG VU NGUYEN
NOVEMBER 2011

Committee Chair: Dr. S. Tamer Cavusgil, Co-Chair
Dr. Daniel C. Bello, Co-Chair
Major Academic Unit: Marketing Department
Working with international suppliers in global supply chains, manufacturing firms now are faced
with substantial supplier risks which could be triggered by disruptions in either their suppliers or
the supplier’s market. Reactive actions to the risks, however, have usually been shown to be
inefficient and sometimes ineffective. In this dissertation, therefore, I develop a theoretical
framework linking some key relationship-specific capabilities to supplier risk. My contention is
that the capabilities, when developed, can help proactively mitigate the risk. Thus, the model in
this study is grounded in the resource-based and the relational views.
In this study, the survey method has been employed to collect data from 66 manufacturing firms
in the United State who are sourcing from international suppliers. Procedural and statistical
methods have been employed to guard against typical empirical issues including non-response
bias, common method bias, and problems in validity and reliability of measurement instruments.

x

Structural equation modeling with partial least squares was employed to test the model with
bootstrapping to estimate t-values for the paths. The analysis results showed support for the
model.
A conclusion from the study is that visibility is the critical relationship-specific capability that
needs to develop for buying firms to mitigate supplier risk proactively. This is because it may not
be substitutable by other mechanisms like goodwill trust, and other capabilities, including
absorptive capacity and IT integration, will only operate via visibility to influence risk
performance. Moreover, visibility is a significant capability that helps mitigate risk regardless of
the relationship duration between the buyer and the supplier and of the market conditions under
which the supplier is working.
This study thus adds to the risk literature with discussions of supplier risks. Nuances have also
been added to the resource-based and relational views by developing the theoretical relationships
among the identified capabilities and by examining the contextual conditions under which the
relationships are working to mitigate supplier risk. Managers from both sides of a dyadic
relationship may benefit from the study by utilizing the tools and the study results to monitor and
mitigate supplier risk.

xi

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Research Background
Risks in supply chains or networks have recently increased in significance and have become a
topic of interest for scholarly research as well as for company practice. Indeed, severe and costly
disruptions have been documented at different companies in various industries including Boeing
and General Motors (Blackhurst et al 2005), Dell, Toyota, and Ericsson (Chopra & Sodhi 2004),
Sony and Nike (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a), Apple (Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz 2005), and
Bosch (Wagner & Bode 2006), to name a few.
The consequence of such disruptions can be economically devastating. For example, in the
recent case of the Boeing 787 project for the Dreamliner, a glitch in a small supplier for Boeing
was pointed out as the culprit for approximately ten billion dollars of loss to the airplane
manufacturer (Gates 2008; Greising & Johnsson 2007; Wallace 2008). While one-time
disruptions of this kind may be costly, these disruptions may trigger adverse repercussions even
for a longer term that will deteriorate company performance in terms of the persistent declines in
sales growth and stock returns (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a, 2003, 2005b). Costly to reverse and
lingering, such negative effects for a company have shown to take months to several years to
address, if they can ever be remedied (Hendricks & Singhal 2003; Knight & Pretty 1996).
Simply put, the damages to a buying firm from supply failures may be severely disruptive and
sticky, and they may be troubling to the company beyond the simple proportion of an operational
mishap.
In working with suppliers, especially foreign ones, therefore, manufacturing firms now are faced
with substantial supplier disruption risks. Such risks increase because manufacturers tend to
1
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depend on suppliers more and more. Considering more than 50% of manufacturers’ budget is
allocated to procuring input from suppliers (Joshi 2009; Wagner & Bode 2006), a typical
manufacturer today is more in “the assembling business than in the business of producing the
components required to create the end product” (Joshi 2009, p. 133). Adding to such risk, the
failure rates of suppliers worldwide have reportedly swung up by 30% in the recent years due to
the current economic crisis. (McKinsey & Company Operations Extranet 2010). As the
economic downturn continues, the supplier risks for buying firms will not diminish but likely
keep increasing.
From the managerial point of view, the practical research question is what can a buying firm do
to mitigate the supplier risk? It has been recently noted that managers in buying firms have not
had an adequate answer to the question (Byrne 2007; Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009). Firms
have been very reactive rather than proactive to the risks. Such corrective actions to the damages,
however, have usually been ineffective and wasteful (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a, 2003, 2005b).
A more precise and important question for the managers then is what can a buying firm do
proactively? In another words, how can a buying firm act before a disruption occurs to prevent or
at least mitigate the potential for substantial damages?
However, such a question remains open. The academic view on the supplier risk is still limited as
the research on supplier risk has usually been descriptive and prescriptive in nature. On the other
hand, there is a burgeoning stream of modeling research which addresses only one or several
types of disruptions in supply chains separately and usually in experimental environments (see
Snyder et al. 2010 for a review). Additionally, scant behavioral research in the field has mostly
focused on the outcomes of the risk (e.g.Lee & Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, &
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Seungjin 2004; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). Thus there seems to be a gap in behavioral studies on
supplier risks with regards to disruptions.
1.2. Research Questions
Motivated by the gap in the research stream, the objective of this study is to identify the key
factors that can help mitigate supplier risk proactively. To achieve this, the current study
endeavors to answer several key research questions.
The first question that needs to be answered is what is supplier risk? This question can be broken
down into several more specific questions. In particular, I would like to understand what is the
nature of supplier risk? It is important to understand the nature of the risk before one can
mitigate it proactively. In a similar vein, it is important to understand how supplier risk is
created. Understanding the process of risk creation is important in order to identify the potential
factors that can mitigate the risk.
The second question is how and why should managers mitigate the supplier risk in a proactive
way? In particular, what factors can managers control to mitigate the supplier risk? And what
theoretical views can one draw on to explain factors that help mitigate the supplier risk?
Through the investigation process, three information-based capabilities can be identified as the
factors that can mitigate supplier risk proactively. My next research questions thus would be
what is the nature of the information-based capabilities, which include visibility, absorptive
capacity, and information technology (IT) integration? And how could they be facilitated each
other in influencing supplier risk?

4

The last question that this dissertation endeavors to answer is how can the links among the
capabilities and to supplier risk change? In another word, I would like to understand what would
be the moderators to the relationships? Related to this question, I would seek to identify potential
control variables that should be included in the model to rule out potential spurious relationships.
1.3. Contributions of the Study
This thesis work purports to make several important contributions to inter-firm literature. First, I
add to the literature on supplier risk by creating a clear conceptualization of supplier risk and by
identifying the key antecedents to the risk. In particular, the concept of supplier risk here is
subjective in nature. This is important because if one is to mitigate the risk proactively, one
needs to evaluate the risk before its management. Moreover, I identify some key informationbased capabilities that can be linked to supplier risk. Such capabilities are actionable factors that
managers can control for and thus can develop to mitigate supplier risk. The overall theoretical
framework developed for this paper is presented in Figure 1-1.
Second, I add to the resource-based and relational view literature by linking relationship-specific
capabilities to perceived supplier risk. As widely posited and tested in various literatures,
capabilities and resources qualified for some certain conditions could result in a firm’s
competitive advantage (Barney 1991). In this work, three relationship-specific capabilities have
been identified. Consideration of the relationship-specific capabilities is important because the
valuable resources may not and should not be limited to the ones within a firm. Instead, the
resources or capabilities can reside in inter-organizational settings in various forms including
dyadic and network types (Dyer & Singh 1998).

5

Environment Factors

Supplier’s
Market
Dynamism

Goodwill Trust

Absorptive
Capacity

Perceived
Supplier Risk

Visibility

IT Integration

Information-based
Capabilities

Information-based
Capabilities

Risk as Performance
Outcomes

Figure 1-1. A Framework for Supplier Risk
Third, I provide a more nuanced picture for the resource-based and relational views by
identifying the configuration of capabilities under which they would influence supplier risk. In
particular, absorptive capacity and IT integration will operate via visibility to mitigate supplier
risk. The configuration of the capabilities here is important because despite the importance of the
capabilities like absorptive capacity and IT integration, the primary source for risk mitigation is
visibility. Such distinction between the capabilities could help explain why firms who are
inefficient in leveraging their absorptive capacity and IT integration could not improve risk
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performance. Thus it demonstrates different ways that capabilities could contribute to
performance, with an emphasis on visibility.
Fourth, I provide a better picture for the pathways that lead to supplier risk by examining several
moderators. The moderators identified here include supplier’s market dynamism and buyer’s
goodwill trust. Thus I can also contribute to the literature on market dynamism and inter-firm
trust and the contextual effects they may have on other capability-performance relationships.
Finally, from a managerial perspective, this paper makes practical contributions by developing
and testing the measurement instruments for supplier risk and visibility. Managers in the buying
firm can utilize the reliable and valid instruments developed in this paper to monitor and mitigate
supplier risk.
1.4. Scope and Boundary Conditions of the Study
The model in this dissertation is shaped by its scope and boundary conditions. In particular, this
study aims to examine one key link in the global supply chains, namely the link between
manufacturing firms and their key international suppliers. Even though important, the
investigation into other links in the chain such as the ones between first-tier and higher-tier
suppliers is not taken in this study.
Moreover, for practical purposes, I only examine the model from the manufacturing firm
perspective. Dyadic data is always desirable but very difficult to obtain, especially for the
relationships between a buying firm and its foreign partner.
It also should be noted that, in an empirical study of this kind, there is always a possibility of
missing independent variables in a model. After thoroughly reviewing the literature, I attempt to
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reach a balance between parsimony and breadth of antecedents. Thus the model in this
dissertation includes the representative independent and control variables. High scores of
explained variance for the dependent variables in the model can provide an evidence of less
potential for missing important independent variables.
Finally, this study employs a survey technique and psychometric multi-item data analysis which
is cross-sectional in nature. This technique is appropriate given the fact that the purpose of this
study is to examine perception of buying firm managers. Other techniques such as experiment,
quasi-experiment, and/or secondary data design, however, can be used in future research to
triangulate and validate results from this study.
1.5. Organization of the Study
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, I provide a review of the key
concepts in the model. Theoretical frameworks for the model are also presented in this chapter.
Chapter III presents a development of the model hypotheses. Relationships in the main model
will be discussed first. Next I discuss the potential moderating effects on the main model
relationships. Chapter IV will follow with discussions on methodology and hypothesis analyses.
In this chapter, I present the sampling design, data collection process, and instrument
development. The chapter concludes with the measurement and structural model analysis results.
Chapter V concludes this dissertation with a discussion of the hypothesis testing results and
implications from the study. I conclude chapter V with a discussion of limitations and respective
recommendations for the directions for further research related to this topic.

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
This chapter provides a literature review for the key concepts in the model. I will start with the
dependent variable, supplier risk. Next, other concepts including visibility, absorptive capacity,
and IT integration will be discussed. The chapter concludes with examination of the moderation
variables: supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust.
2.1. Supplier Risk
In this study, perceived supplier disruption risk (hereafter perceived supplier risk) refers to the
buyer’s expectation of probable disruption on the supplier’s side that causes loss to the buyer due
to unavailability of a sourced item. The failure of having the item may be due to disruptions
which are attributed to either the supplier internals or to the business environment of the supplier.
Note that because a buying firm may buy different items from one supplier, we limit the level of
analysis at the firm level to one particular regularly-purchased critical item. To better delineate
the concept, in the following sections I will elaborate on the general concept of organizational
risk and clarify our focus on the subjective rather than the objective risk. Next I identify the key
components of perceived risk and the possible triggers of supplier risk. I conclude the section by
reviewing literature on supplier risk with suggestions for potential antecedents of the risk.
2.1.1. Definition of Risk
The task of defining organizational risks has been deceptively simple in the literature. Different
scholars have adopted different definitions of risks (Khan & Burnes 2007; Yates & Stone
1992b). Conceptually these definitions have fallen into two categories: (1) variation in
distribution of outcomes or performance; and (2) potential losses or general threats or hazards.
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The first approach to risk definition could be traced back to classical decision theory (e.g. Arrow
1965; Pratt 1964). Under this perspective, risk is “most commonly conceived as reflecting
variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values”
(March & Shapira 1987, p. 1404) or variability (Jemison 1987). A riskier choice involves having
a higher variance in outcomes while keeping the expected outcome constant. Under this
perspective, therefore, the attitude toward risk could be classified as risk-taking, risk-neutral, or
risk-averse based on the choice among options of the same return but with different outcome
variances. This conceptualization of risk has been adopted most widely in finance where risk is
considered volatility in outcomes and sometimes in other literature such as international business
(cf. Miller 1992).
However, the problem with this conceptualization is that, in practice, managers do not usually
view risks in this way. In a seminal article, March and Shapira reported survey results with
American, Canadian, and Israeli managers and found several interesting discrepancies between
the managerial perspective and the classical theoretical definition of risk (March & Shapira
1987). Two most notable points have been made. First, managers did not treat variance with
positive outcomes as risk. They only focus on the negative outcomes. This observation matches
with earlier criticisms on risk as total variation (e.g. Markowitz 1952) and has led to models
based on semi-variance (e.g. Coombs 1983; Fishburn 1977), which is often termed downside risk
(Das & Teng 2001). Second and more interesting, risk was not processed by managers by
explicit consideration of statistical probability outcomes. Instead, while uncertainty is considered
an important component of risk, managers also focus on the potential harm and damage from
subjective perspective. For them, the risk represents “amount to lose (or expected to be lost) than
in terms of moments of the outcome distribution” (March & Shapira 1987, p. 1407). This
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observation was also supported by a recent grounded theory research where supply risk was
viewed not only by potential disruptive events to the supply but also their negative impacts on a
buyer (Zsidisin 2003). These survey results have impacted the later conceptualization of risk,
especially in scientific disciplines other than finance and insurance (Khan & Burnes 2007; Peck
2006).
Possibly cultivated on the above results, later researchers in various disciplines have adopted
similar conceptualizations of risk which could often be traced back to Yates and Stone (1992b).
Under this stream of studies, risk refers to the “possibility of loss” or potential losses (Yates &
Stone 1992b, p. 4). This definition of risk is in line with research in various disciplines including
political science (e.g. Kobrin 1979), consumer behavior (e.g. Dowling 1986; Dowling & Staelin
1994), purchasing firm behavior (e.g. Mitchell 1995; Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk 2005), and
supply chain/networks (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Hallikas et al 2004; Zsidisin &
Ellram 2003).
In short, definitions of risk may be context-dependent (Spekman & Davis 2004). For the purpose
of this study, I refer to risk as expectation of potential loss. This definition is based on the
following reasoning. First, as we will examine risks from purchasing managers’ perspective,
adopting this definition, which stemmed from the manager’s perspective, is justifiable. Second,
the definition has been usually adopted in organizational buying and supply chain literature
which is also our context of study (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Zsidisin 2003). Defining
risk as possibility of loss rather than the variation as in the classical decision theory, therefore, is
well justified.
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2.1.2. Objective versus Subjective Risk
While risk could be viewed as possibility of loss, the debate over the nature of risk about whether
risk is objective or subjective has not been resolved (Khan & Burnes 2007). On one hand, risk
could be viewed as objectively calculated based on full knowledge of different outcomes and
their probabilities (Das & Teng 2001). On the other hand, risk could be viewed from the decision
maker’s perspective and considered subjective in nature (Dowling 1986; Mitchell 1995). To
many social scientists, risk cannot be objective because a decision maker may only consider
several outcomes rather than the whole distribution of outcomes (March & Shapira 1987). He is
boundedly rational (Williamson 1991). Moreover, even with full knowledge of potential losses,
interpretation of the likelihood of outcomes occurring and the degree of losses due to the
outcomes is still inherently subjective (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Yates & Stone 1992b).
What outcome is considered positive by some can be considered negative by others (Yates &
Stone 1992b). As some scholars noted, the debate over the nature of risk may represent the
tension between measuring risk ex ante or ex post (Jemison 1987) or could be boiled down to a
question of to what extent does the past determine the future (Khan & Burnes 2007).
Because I will examine risk from the manager’s perspective, I take the latter view and consider
risk as subjective (i.e. perceived risk). Additionally, we usually deal with risk perception rather
than objective risk when it comes to the decision maker’s behaviors (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley
2010; Spekman & Davis 2004). Executives also usually base their decisions on a feel of overall
risk (Shapira 1995) or managers describe projects in terms of overall riskiness (Yates & Stone
1992a). Thus studying perceived risk, rather than objective one, is important in organizational
behavioral science and relevant in this particular context.
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2.1.3. Key Components of Perceived Risk
There are two components of perceived risk that have been commonly accepted in literature,
namely uncertainty and adverse consequence (Dowling 1986; Yates & Stone 1992b; Zsidisin,
Melnyk, & Ragatz 2005). The first component of perceived risk, uncertainty, has been
represented in some form of likelihood function. Such likelihood can be estimated, subjectively
assigned, or obtained from statistical models. However, all come to the same result since the
differences are not in the concept of future likelihood of events but the ways that future is
assigned various probabilistic weights. In this study, I take the view that perception of
uncertainty of future states is expressed as a degree from one extreme where there is no basis to
establish knowledge about probabilities and outcome to the other extreme with complete
knowledge (Mitchell 1995; Zsidisin 2003). The second component, the adverse consequence,
represents the magnitude of losses to an organization. There may be different types of losses
incurred by an organization including financial, performance, psychological, physical, social,
and time losses (Dowling 1986; Mitchell 1995).
The question of how these two components will work together to become the overall risk has not
been answered unanimously. A group of scholars often use the multiplicity of the two
components because the absence of either one may eliminate risk (cf. Dowling 1986). For others,
however, the two components are formative (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; March &
Shapira 1987). This is because some theorists note the difficulty in equating the risk of high
probability and low magnitude loss with the one of low probability and high magnitude (Ellis,
Henry, & Shockley 2010). Thus, they suggest that the likelihood of outcomes and their values
enter into calculations of risk independently rather than as their products (March & Shapira
1987). Still, others consider the two components to be independent and postulate that they would
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be considered in two successive stages of assessment (Yates & Stone 1992a), where the
likelihood of an event occurring may be evaluated first before an assessment of the impact of the
event occurring is made. In fact, a recent survey by Zsidisin with supply chain managers seems
to support this third view because the managers in the survey seemed to consider supply risk first
as the possibility of an incident associated with inbound supply and then as its outcomes
resulting in losses to the buyer (cf. Zsidisin 2003).
Concurring with the third view, definition of perceived supplier risk in this study focuses more
on the possibility of unavailability of sourced item than its resulting losses. Thus the concept of
perceived risk here may bear a close relationship with the concepts of fear (Mitchell 1995), lack
of confidence (Christopher & Lee 2004), and the feeling of uncertainty, discomfort, and/or
anxiety (Dowling & Staelin 1994) over the availability of sourced item. Our definition here also
matches with definition of risk in various literatures including international business (e.g.
Mascarenhas 1982; Werner, Brouthers, & Brouthers 1996), consumer behavior (e.g. Dowling &
Staelin 1994), and especially in supply chain management, the context of this study (e.g. Chopra
& Sodhi 2004; Harland, Brenchley, & Walker 2003; Tang 2006a).
2.1.4. Triggers of Perceived Supplier Risks
The supply chain literature has provided different taxonomies/typologies of risks in supply
chain/network (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi 2004; Hallikas, Virolainen, & Tuominen 2002; Spekman &
Davis 2004). In general, risks in supply chain could be classified into demand risks and supply
risks if we take a manufacturer as the dividing position in a supply chain. This study focuses on
the supply side, and more specifically in the relationship between a buying firm and one of its
suppliers (i.e. supplier risk), rather than on the demand side.
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Within the supply side, however, there may be different types of risk. For the purpose of this
paper, I adopt a recent classification of supply risks by Spekman and Davis (2004) which is
based on the triggers of risk. Under this classification, risks include (1) business disruption risk,
where disruptions are from the events such as failures by the suppliers and/or in logistic
operations; (2) exogenous disruption risk, where disruptions are from events such as natural
disasters and political changes that impact supplier performance in providing inputs to the
buying firm; (3) opportunism risk, where risk comes from opportunistic behaviors by the
suppliers; (4) system security risk, where the risk arises from activities which cause problems in
system security; and (5) social corporate risk, where risk is rooted in the actions by suppliers that
taint the social responsibility image or reputation of the buying firm. This dissertation develops a
theoretical framework with regards to the first two types of risk triggers. However, note that for a
purchasing firm, major disruptions to its supplier will only matter when they influence the supply
to the firm. In another words, the exogenous disruptions to the supplier could only become a risk
to the buyer when they cascade the effects via the supplier onto the buyer (Wagner & Bode
2006). We, therefore, can combine the two risk triggers for a common supplier risk.
Various internal and external types of disruptions have been recorded in literature (e.g. Chopra &
Sodhi 2004; Hallikas, Virolainen, & Tuominen 2002; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). Table 2-1
provides a summary for different types of supplier risks identified in literature. In particular, for
example, risks due to business disruption events may come from the failures of suppliers and/or
in logistic performance that may cause a supplier delays or breakdowns in providing goods and
services to the buying firm. Any problems in flows of goods/materials, information, and money
between a buying firm and its suppliers could result in these risks (Spekman & Davis 2004).
Different supplier failures have been identified in the literature, including inability of suppliers to

15

deal with volumes and mixed requirement changes resulting in a stock-out from suppliers;
inability of suppliers to meet with technological development in the market; quality-related risks
from failures of suppliers to maintain capital equipment or damages that occur in transit or lack
of supplier training in quality principles and techniques; price increase risk when suppliers
increase good price due to the increase in price of supply inputs or currency fluctuations; logistic
risks from problems in shipping, transportation, or delivery performance leading to delays or
breakdown in focal firm operation; and failures of suppliers due to their financial instability or
insolvency or as they are vertically integrated by a direct competitor of a focal firm (Hallikas,
Virolainen, & Tuominen 2002; Kleindorfer & Saad 2005; Spekman & Davis 2004; Wagner &
Bode 2008, 2006; Zsidisin 2003; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003).
A more recently noticeable category of risk triggers is major exogenous disruptions. Different
major triggers have been recorded in the literature, including natural catastrophic disasters such
as volcanoes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and fires. They may also include major political and social
events such as labor disputes, war, terrorism, and political changes (e.g. Chopra & Sodhi 2004;
Kleindorfer & Saad 2005; Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009; Kobrin 1979; Tang 2006a, 2006b;
Wagner & Bode 2008, 2006; Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz 2005; Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk
2005). These major disruption events are exogenous events which may occur to a supplier. For a
buying firm, the critical issue is if such events can cascade their effects on the firm via impacting
its suppliers.
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Table 2-1. Triggers of Supplier Risk
Categories
Risks due to
Business
Disruption
Events

Risk Sources/Triggers
Volumes and mixed requirement change risks that lead
to possible stock-out from suppliers.

Technological change risk that is due to the inability of
suppliers to meet with technological development to
provide the needed item.

Quality-related risks include failure of suppliers to
maintain capital equipment, damage that occurs in transit,
and lack of supplier training in quality principles and
techniques.

Price increase risk because of market changes such as
increase in price paid for supplier inputs and currency
fluctuations.

Logistics risk due to problems in shipping, transportation,
or distribution methods and lead time, delivery
performance.

Risk due to
Exogenous
Disruption
Events

Other supplier business risks: various events that affect
the continuity of the supplier and result in the temporary
or permanent perturbation or termination of the buyer–
supplier relationship. Example: financial instability of
suppliers and when a supplier is vertically integrated by a
direct competitor of the customer firm.
Natural disruption risks: difficult to predict but when
occur will have immediate and significant impacts on
performance such as natural disasters and other
catastrophic events.

Political risks from political events such as government
acts or constraints put on firms.

Articles/Authors
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
(Zsidisin 2003)
(Spekman & Davis 2004)
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003)
(Wagner & Bode 2006)
(Wagner & Bode 2008)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
(Zsidisin 2003)
(Spekman & Davis 2004)
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003)
(Wagner & Bode 2006)
(Wagner & Bode 2008)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
(Zsidisin 2003)
(Spekman & Davis 2004)
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003)
(Wagner & Bode 2006)
(Wagner & Bode 2008)
(Hallikas, Virolainen, &
Tuominen 2002)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
(Chopra & Sodhi 2004)
(Zsidisin 2003)
(Spekman & Davis 2004)
(Zsidisin & Ellram 2003)
(Hallikas, Virolainen, &
Tuominen 2002)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
(Zsidisin 2003)
(Spekman & Davis 2004)
(Wagner & Bode 2006)
(Wagner & Bode 2008)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
(Zsidisin 2003)
(Spekman & Davis 2004)
(Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz
2005)
(Zsidisin, Ragatz, & Melnyk
2005)
(Wagner & Bode 2006)
(Wagner & Bode 2008)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
(Tang 2006b)
(Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009)
(Chopra & Sodhi 2004)
(Kobrin 1979)
(Kleindorfer & Saad 2005)
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2.2. Gap in Supplier Risk Literature
Literature on supplier risk in supply chains has been strong on descriptive and prescriptive
accounts. For example, a substantial number of articles described or prescribed risk management
process (see for example Giunipero & Eltantawy 2004; Hallikas et al 2004; Khan & Burnes
2007; Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu 2009; Manuj & Mentzer 2008). The common format for all the
articles is to start with descriptions of risk in supply chains and then recommended different
strategies for mitigating the risk. On the other hand, there have been an increasing number of
modeling papers on disruption risk in supply chain (see Snyder et al 2010 for a review). Though
useful, such papers usually address only one or several types of disruptions, and some of these
have been conducted in an experimental setting. Thus there is a gap in behavioral studies on
supplier risks and risks in supply chain with regards to disruptions.
Within this research stream, there is scant empirical evidence from behavioral studies on the
outcomes of risk rather than on why and how the perception of risk is developed (Ellis, Henry, &
Shockley 2010). Some examples include Zsidisin and Ellram (2003),who found that perceived
supplier risks could result in purchasing firms engaging in different types of risk mitigation
strategies. When a purchasing firm perceives high risk from its supplier, it invests more in
behavior-based strategies including implementing supplier certification and quality management
programs, developing target costing with suppliers, and launching different supplier development
programs (Zsidisin & Ellram 2003). It has also been found that lack of confidence in the supply
chain could result in excessive buffering activities by all players, resulting in inefficiency along
the chain (Lee & Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee, Padmanabhan,
& Wang 1997). And finally, perceived supplier risk has been found to associate with higher
search activities for alternative suppliers (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010).

18

In fact, Ellis et al. (2010) could be the only exception that provided some initial evidence on
several factors that lead to perceived supplier risks with regards to disruptions. The explained
variance for this model, however, is relatively low (nearly 12 percent for the uncertainty
component of risk) and two factors that were found to be related to the uncertainty component of
risk are technological uncertainty and market thinness. These factors are environmental or
structural factors that a firm may not be able to control. So far, no actionable factors that a buyer
can develop and control have been identified to mitigate the risk proactively.
To fill in the gap, in this dissertation I examine some key information-based capability factors
that explain the development of perceived supplier risks at the organizational level. The logic
here is that if we are to mitigate supplier risk proactively, we need to identify some key
actionable factors that help mitigate the risk. Such key factors should be information-related
because risk is about uncertainty. Moreover, if disruption risk could be considered an indicator of
performance (i.e. reverse of high performance), capabilities can be linked to risk under the
resource-based or relational views (Barney 1991; Dyer & Singh 1998), which I’ll discuss in
more detail in the next section.
2.3. Theoretical Framework for Supplier Risk
In order to examine our model under the resource-based view (RBV) and relational view, one
assumption needs to be made: disruption risk is a reverse indicator of performance. In another
words, high risk of disruptions should mean the likelihood of high performance will be low. This
assumption can be justified given the recent empirical evidence. In particular, in a series of
empirical studies, Henricks and Singhal examined several hundreds of supply chain disruptions
reported in the Wall Street Journal and Down Jones News Service (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a,
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2003, 2005b). They found that the companies experiencing minor to major disruptions in supply
chain faced with significant declines in sales growth, stock return, and shareholder wealth.
Moreover, such effects tended to linger for a long time, at least two years after the disruptions.
These findings are also consistent with previous findings that the impact of a disruption on
shareholder wealth was a sharp decrease of almost eight percent, and a recovery time, if possible,
was at least 50 trading days (Knight & Pretty 1996). Thus, as an indicator of performance, risk
could be examined under the RBV and relational view to identify its link to some key
resources/capabilities.
This dissertation establishes itself in the tradition of RBV and the relational view. In particular, I
view sources of competitive advantage as the resources and/or capabilities that a firm possesses.
Different from the traditional neo-classical economic view, the assumption behind my thesis
rests on the RBV contention that firm resources may be heterogeneous and immobile (Barney
1991; Wernerfelt 1984). Therefore resource and capability differentials between firms lead to
different levels of risk exposure. As the RBV postulates, I argue that sustainability of risk
performance of a company (as a source of competitive advantage) is driven by its resources and
capabilities that meet some key conditions including: valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable (Barney 1991). Thus three supply network capabilities examined in this study,
absorptive capacity, IT integration, and visibility, determine and sustain competitive advantage
for a firm to the extent that they can meet the above conditions. This view parallels the central
theoretical lens in the marketing and inter-firm literature under which researchers examined the
links between market-based assets and capabilities (e.g. Day 1994; Hunt & Morgan 1995;
Srivastava, Fahey, & Christensen 2001; Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey 1998) and supply chain
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capabilities (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009; Wu et al 2006) in terms of marketing, financial, and
relationship-specific performance.
More importantly, I propose that the sources for competitive advantages not only lie in the
resources and capabilities developed within a firm but also in those that are embedded in a
dyadic or network relationship of the firm (Dyer & Singh 1998). Extended from the original
RBV which recognized firm-specific barriers to imitation and advocated for firms to control the
critical resources (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984), I see the resources and capabilities as being
enabled by value-adding initiatives facilitated by inter-firm routines under the relational view
(Dyer & Singh 1998). Thus the dyadic and network capabilities, including absorptive capacity,
IT integration, and visibility, are relationship-specific capabilities, which are enabled and natured
in a trading-partner relationship that can result in high performance in terms of low supplier risk
for a buying firm. This view parallels the theoretical perspective in various recent inter-firm
studies (cf. R. Klein & Rai 2009).
The relational view is particularly applicable here because the concept of supplier risk in this
study is examined within a relationship between a buyer and a seller. Moreover, as discussed in
the previous sections, the key element of our concept of supplier risk is uncertainty, which is
information-related. Thus the natural logic is to identify the information-based capabilities that
can be linked to supplier risk, three of which are of particular interest and have recently been
stressed in inter-firm literature: visibility, absorptive capacity, and IT integration. In the next
sections, I discuss each of the capabilities in more detail.
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2.4. Visibility
Visibility is an important relationship-specific information-based capability. Even though this
concept has been a popular buzzword the term remains elusive, especially in supply chain
literature (Barratt & Oke 2007). Recently, researchers have been calling for a better
understanding of the concept (e.g. Wang & Wei 2007) and an untangling of its workings in
practice (e.g. Straub et al 2002; Wang & Wei 2007). In particular, this concept has usually been
used interchangeably with other popular notions such as information sharing (Barratt & Oke
2007; Swaminathan & Tayur 2003) and transparency (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004;
Lamming et al 2001). The visibility concept in this dissertation is built on an emerging concept
of transparency (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al 2001) that goes beyond
but takes information sharing as a baseline prerequisite. Thus in the following sections, I
introduce the concept of visibility, its attributes and information content, and a review of
literature related to the concept for its potential antecedents and outcomes.
2.4.1. Visibility Definition and Attributes
In our discussion, a buyer’s visibility into its supplier (hereafter visibility) refers to the extent to
which a focal buying firm is able to access timely, accurate, and relevant information about its
supplier’s operational and strategic issues. We maintain that visibility is a key relationshipspecific capability of the organization and is distinct from information sharing because of the
following attributes.
First, extant literature in inter-organizational studies has stressed the importance of sharing
information among partners to resolve conflict and enhance performance (e.g. Frazier et al 2009;
R. Klein & Rai 2009; Wu et al 2006). Information sharing here has usually been understood as
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“the degree to which each party in a channel relationship discloses information to facilitate the
other party’s activities” (Heide & Miner 1992, p. 275). The visibility concept in this dissertation
benefits from this stream of literature and requires information exchange as a baseline
prerequisite. This is because for a firm to have access to the partner’s information, the
information needs to be shared and obtained from its external sources.
It should be noted that the concept of visibility here does not focus on the mechanistic flows of
information sharing but the outcome of such flows, which is the access that the firm have to its
partner’s information. Thus I will not consider the flow characteristics in a more mechanistic
view, such as bi-directional versus unidirectional, formal versus informal, direct influence versus
indirect influence, and frequency of contacts among inter-firm members (Mohr, Fisher, & Nevin
1999; Mohr & Nevin 1990). Instead, the concept of visibility here only stresses the degree of
access that a firm has over its partner’s information. This is because even though important and
sometimes inevitable, the flows of information from a trading partner may not be the only
determinant of the access to the partner’s information (Frazier et al 2009; Frishammar & Sven
Åke 2005).
The second attribute of visibility is transparency, an emerging concept that underlines and
sometimes supplants visibility. Transparency in supply relationships has appeared in several
works by Lamming and his co-authors (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al
2001). Under this perspective, transparency is defined as “the creation, nurture, and delivery of
value, for the benefit, and thus continued existence, of both parties” (Lamming et al 2001, p. 7).
The critical point that makes the transparency an attribute of visibility is the requirement for
information efficacy. This is because transparency here does not assume perfect access to
information and knowledge. In fact, perfect clarity may never exist, and too much information
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may limit transparency (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004). Empirical evidence has already
showed that too much information may lead to the problem of information overload (e.g. Gosain,
Malhotra, & El Sawy 2004). Transparency therefore requires that the partners exchange only the
relevant information which, and more importantly, is needed for mutual benefits. The mutual
benefits here are considered within the realm of partners’ abilities to create, nurture, and deliver
values for their customers rather than solely focusing on cost.
For the above reasons, in this study I argue that for partners to obtain benefits from information
and knowledge, visibility requires information to be both potentially accessible and content-wise
efficacious. In particular, the concept of visibility in this dissertation focuses on three regularlyexamined efficacious elements: accuracy, relevance, and timeliness (e.g. Hult et al 2006; Kim,
Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; Mohr & Sohi 1995), which have seemed to be relatively easily
discerned by business managers.
2.4.2. Information Content of Visibility
Extant literature has examined different types of information shared among trading partners.
Some authors even attempt to categorize distinctive types of information that would be shared
among the partners at different degrees (e.g. Hultman & Axelsson 2007; Wareham et al 2005),
thus possibly resulting in different types of visibility. To date, however, the distinction of such
categories lacks empirical support. For example, Hultman and Axelsson (2007) built on the
works of Lamming et al. (2004; 2005; 2001) and some case studies to propose a typology of
transparency including cost transparency, supply transparency, organizational transparency, and
technological transparency. This typology, however, may not be generalizable because (1) it is
not theory-based and is built on case studies of only two Swedish manufacturing firms, and (2)
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the main focus of the typology is on “descriptions of transparency enabled by information
technology” (Hultman & Axelsson 2007, p. 627) even though the authors claimed that it could
be applicable to transparency in general. It should be noted that while important, IT is not the
only channel for communication. In fact, non-IT communication channels, including face-toface, has been shown to be more effective in exchanging complex and hard-to-codify knowledge
(e.g. Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel 2010). Thus this typology needs to be exposed to further
empirical testing to confirm its usefulness
Similarly, even though built on extant theories, the framework by Wareham et al. (2005), which
proposed two types of information shared, including strategic and operational, has not been
tested empirically. As noted by the authors, operational information includes data that can be
related to specific process or transaction pertinent to the planning and execution of operations
(Wareham et al 2005). For example, operational data pertains to the process of deploying input
resources to produce products and services including production, capacity, and inventory
schedules and plan (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009; Noordewier, John, & Nevin 1990). Strategic
information, on the other hand, is usually characterized by a longer term perspective and could
span cognition about the external environment, scarce and valuable resources, and other
capabilities (Wareham et al 2005). Example includes information such as cost structure and
margins (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009; Lamming et al 2001), firm competitive positioning, and
planned actions in the market (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009). However, the authors also
acknowledged that even though two types of information can be used in managerial decision
making in different manners, “the difference between the two is often a function of aggregation
where operational data can be combined to form strategic data” (Wareham et al 2005, p. 207).
The distinction between the two thus may not be discernable by practicing managers. Moreover,
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this framework was exposed to only one case study by the authors and therefore has not yet been
proved for their generalizability.
Thus in this study, I examine both types of information, strategic and operational, as they are
theory-based concepts. The distinction between the two and thus the resulting difference between
two possible types of visibility, however, will be subjected to empirical evidence.
In short, visibility in this dissertation includes two key attributes: the access of information
regarding a trading partner and the efficacy of the information obtained. I examine both
operational and strategic types of information when measuring visibility. The next section
discusses a theoretical framework for examining the outcome and antecedents of visibility.
2.4.3. Theoretical Framework for Visibility
Information sharing and visibility have been studied under different theories in vertical inter-firm
studies, including the channel literature (e.g. James C. Anderson & Narus 1990; Bello, Chelariu,
& Zhang 2003; Frazier et al 2009; Griffith, Myers, & Harvey 2006; Heide & Miner 1992;
McEvily & Marcus 2005; Noordewier, John, & Nevin 1990) and supply chain studies (e.g.
Gustin, Daugherty, & Stank 1995; Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; R. Klein & Rai 2009; Lee
& Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Wang 1997;
Lee, So, & Tang 2000; Sahin & Robinson 2002, 2005; Wareham et al 2005; Wu et al 2006; Zhou
& Benton Jr 2007). Under these streams of research, the presence of information sharing or
exchange is considered to facilitate better relationships, enhance cooperation (James C.
Anderson & Narus 1990), improve joint-problem solving (McEvily & Marcus 2005), eliminate
the agency problems (Griffith, Myers, & Harvey 2006), and as a result, enhance competitive
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advantages such as superior purchasing performance (Noordewier, John, & Nevin 1990) and
economic performance (Bello, Chelariu, & Zhang 2003; Bello & Gilliland 1997).
In addition to the above conflict resolving view of information sharing, the supply chain
literature also recognizes the importance of information sharing in enhancing operations and
working of the chain or network structure. In this stream of studies, information is considered to
be instrumental to reducing variability, integrating the structure, and enhancing efficiency. With
those goals in mind scholars stressed the importance of making information available to all
parties in a supply network (Wareham et al 2005). The information could be the demand
information that downstream parties share with upstream partners (Lee & Padmanabhan 1997;
Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Wang 1997; Lee, So, & Tang 2000)
or supply information including inventory and cost structure that suppliers share with
downstream parties (Sahin & Robinson 2002, 2005). Sharing upstream and downstream
information provides multiple benefits for the relationship including mitigating bullwhip effect
in supply chain (Lee & Padmanabhan 1997; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Seungjin 2004; Lee,
Padmanabhan, & Wang 1997; Lee, So, & Tang 2000), facilitating success of logistic system
integration (Gustin, Daugherty, & Stank 1995), reducing total costs for better supply chain
performance (Sahin & Robinson 2002, 2005), and enhancing market and operational
performance for the whole chain (Wareham et al 2005).
Table 2-2 provides a summary of the representative articles examining information sharing and
visibility. It should be noted that no articles up to present examined visibility for a firm into its
partner. Moreover, most empirical studies to date have been dealing with the concept of
information sharing. Only recent theoretical advances have discussed the concept of transparency
and visibility (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al 2005; Lamming et al 2001)
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but empirical evidence has not shed much light on the concept. Thus this study adds to the interfirm literature by examining the relationship-specific concept of visibility in its links to supplier
risk and other capabilities. Two streams of research with their theoretical perspectives are
particularly applicable to visibility here. In particular, one line of research has focused on the
consequences of visibility. In the second, antecedents to visibility can be explored.
On the outcome side, sharing information among partners has long been recognized as an
important part of prominent theories for dyadic relationships. The marks of cooperative
information exchange and sharing can be seen in theories that include dependence theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), agency theories (Bergen, Dutta, & Walker Jr 1992; Eisenhardt 1989),
the resource-based view (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984), and the relational view (Dyer & Singh
1998). Considering the link between visibility and risk, the final two theoretical views, which
have been widely applied more recently, can be drawn on.
In particular, under the resource-based view, possession of information from a trading partner
can help a firm gain competitive advantage because such information is valuable and can help
the firm reconfigure its operation for the best performance (Barney 1991; Wu et al 2006). Such
information is usually sensitive and proprietary and thus the possession of it is difficult to
imitate. Gaining access to a supplier’s information therefore may help a buying firm obtain
competitive advantage by lowering risk from the supplier. More importantly, such capability (i.e.
visibility) may only be developed within a relationship. Such relationship-specific capability thus
can result in the relational rents (Dyer & Singh 1998) which are accrued only to the partners in a
relationship, beyond the ones that any single firm could obtain alone (Dyer & Nobeoka 2000).
Thus reduction in supplier risk is the relational rent that I examine in this dissertation.
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Table 2-2. Representative Articles Examined Information Sharing and Visibility
Level of
Analysis
Information
Sharing at
Chain/
Network
Level

Information
Sharing at
Focal Firm
Level

Definition and Dimensions

Efficacy of
Information
Examined

Content of
Information
Examined

Information
availability

No

Operational

The degree to which information is available
or exchanged within a distribution system.

Information
Sharing

No

Operational

Information shared among upstream to
downstream. The focus is on sharing demand
information to upstream partners.

Information
Sharing

N/A

Operational

Information
Sharing

No

Operational
Strategic

Information to
supplier

N/A

Operational

The timing and specific data shared ranged
from only sharing the immediate
replenishment order to sharing all POS,
inventory, and cost data along the supply
chain.
The availability of information shared within
network including two separate types:
- Strategic information is typically
characterized by a longer temporal
perspective and is not related to specific
process operations.
- Operational Information Sharing includes
data that can be related to the planning or
execution of a specific process or transaction.
Information provided to supplier.

Monitoring of
supplier

No

Operational

Terms/
Aliases of
Construct

Antecedents/ Outcomes

Lead to
Success of logistic system
integration
Lead to
Lower bullwhip effects

Lead to
Higher Supply Chain
Performance (reduce costs)

Representative
Authors, Year
(Gustin, Daugherty,
& Stank 1995)
(Lee &
Padmanabhan
1997; Lee,
Padmanabhan, &
Seungjin 2004;
Lee, Padmanabhan,
& Wang 1997; Lee,
So, & Tang 2000)
(Sahin & Robinson
2002, 2005)

Lead to
- Market Performance
- Operational Performance
(respectively)

(Wareham et al
2005)

Lead to
Higher Purchasing
performance
Leads to
Higher Purchasing
performance

(Noordewier, John,
& Nevin 1990)
(Noordewier, John,
& Nevin 1990)
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Level of
Analysis
Information
Sharing at
Focal Firm
Level
(continued)

Definition and Dimensions

Antecedents/ Outcomes

Representative
Authors, Year

The degree to which each party discloses
information that may facilitate the other
party’s activities (Heide & Miner 1992, p.
275).
The sharing of generalized information about
the firm, its product, and its customers

Leads to
Better joint-problem
solving and acquisition of
competitive capabilities.
Anteceded by
Commitment
Lead to
Problem Solution
Anteceded by
Focal firm’s Trust,
Dependence, IT
customization
Lead to
Higher Buyer and Supplier
Relationship-specific
Performance
Sharing of strategic internal
information is
anteceded by
Distributor trust,
Dependence Asymmetry
favoring distributor,
Specific investment by
distributor and by supplier.

(McEvily &
Marcus 2005)
(Heide & Miner
1992)
(Griffith, Myers, &
Harvey 2006)

Efficacy of
Information
Examined

Content of
Information
Examined

Information
Sharing

No

Operational
Strategic

Sharing of
information

N/A

N/A

Strategic
information
flow

No

Strategic

The flow of information from:
buyer to supplier
supplier to buyer

Distributor
Sharing of
Strategic
Information

No

Strategic

Strategic information is processed and
retained data within a distributor organization
that have implications for firms’ long-range
decision making including external and
internal information.

Terms/
Aliases of
Construct

Sharing of strategic
external information is
anteceded by
Dependence Asymmetry
favoring distributor,
Specific investment by
distributor and by supplier.

(R. Klein & Rai
2009)

(Frazier et al 2009)

30

Level of
Analysis
Visibility at
Channel/
Chain/
Network
Level

Definition and Dimensions

Efficacy of
Information
Examined

Content of
Information
Examined

Information
Exchange

Yes

N/A

Formal and informal sharing of meaningful
and timely information between firms.
Information Exchange is a dimension of
Relationalism (MacNeil 1980) and therefore
measured at the expectation/norms level.

Information
Exchange

No

IT system

Transparency

Yes

Operational
Strategic

Information
exchange

Yes

IT system

Supply chain
visibility

Yes

Operational

Information exchange refers to the ability of a
firm to share knowledge with its supply chain
partners in an effective and efficient manner.
The focus here, however, is on information
system as a whole.
The creation, nurture, and delivery of value,
for the benefit, and thus continued existence,
of both parties.
Transparency is achieved through two-way
exchange of sensitive data for specific
purposes of improvements in the dyad itself.
Customers usually ask suppliers for
information about process factors, largely
represented by costs (as proxies for process
times, physical space allocation, management
superstructure, communications requirements,
etc.)
The sharing of knowledge with channel
partners to serve downstream customers
effectively and efficiently. Such knowledge
would include any changes in the business
environment, such as market and customer
preferences.
Dimensions of information exchange include
timeliness, accuracy, efficacy, completeness,
and credibility of information.
The extent to which actors within a supply
chain have access to or share information
which they consider as key or useful to their
operations and which they consider will be of
mutual benefit.
The information needs to be accurate, trusted,
timely, current, useful, and in-a-readily-usable
format.

Terms/
Aliases of
Construct

Antecedents/ Outcomes

Representative
Authors, Year

Anteceded by
Manufacturer’s dependence
and other dyadic
antecedents,
Leads to
Channel Performance
Lead to
Marketing and Financial
Performance

(James C.
Anderson & Narus
1990; Bello,
Chelariu, & Zhang
2003; Heide &
John 1992)
(Wu et al 2006)
adapted from (Amit
& Schoemaker
1993; Bharadwaj
2000; Collis 1994)
(Lamming,
Caldwell, &
Harrison 2004;
Lamming et al
2005; Lamming et
al 2001)

Anteceded by
Interdependence rather than
trust,
Leads to
higher performance
(competitive advantage or
created values)

Anteceded by
IT System Integration and
Advancement
Lead to
Responsiveness,
Coordination, and Market
Performance

(Kim, Cavusgil, &
Calantone 2006)

Anteceded by Information
Sharing
Leads to
Enhanced Performance

(Barratt & Oke
2007)
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Level of
Analysis
Visibility at
Channel/
Chain/
Network
Level
(continued)

Definition and Dimensions

Antecedents/ Outcomes

Operational

The degree to which supply chain partners
have on-hand information related to both
demand and supply for planning and control
management. Two dimensions are measured:
reliability and timeliness of information.

Operational

Higher order constructs of information
content (manufacturing and customer), info
sharing tech support, and quality of info
sharing.

Anteceded by
Relational Governance and
Virtual (IT) Integration
Leads to
Supply Chain Offering
Flexibility
Lead to
Effectiveness of Supply
Chain Practices (JIT)

Efficacy of
Information
Examined

Content of
Information
Examined

Information
Visibility

Yes

Information
Sharing

Yes

Terms/
Aliases of
Construct

* N/A: not available or not applicable

Representative
Authors, Year
(Wang & Wei
2007)

(Zhou & Benton Jr
2007)

32

On the antecedent side of visibility, a second stream of research examined different factors that
could lead to information sharing and visibility. Contrary to the perspective of neoclassical
economics, this stream of research started with the assumption that information is imperfect and
access to information is limited and costly in the real world (Stiglitz 2000). Thus many of the
classical economic results require adjustments (Stiglitz 2000). In particular, when the simplifying
assumption of perfect information is removed, the economic treatment and analysis of
information becomes formidable. Such a challenge starts from non-tradable nature of
information that in turn makes it hard to be priced in the market. Unlike other goods, information
presents many characteristics of public goods as non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. That means it
is usually difficult to exclude others from benefits of the information and it is not depletable with
use (Stiglitz 2000). Under these conditions marginal cost of information approaches to zero with
which free riding problem arises. Moreover information sharing is irreversible because when
information is shared, it could not be taken back (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004;
Lamming et al 2005). These complications present big challenges in analyzing appropriation of
returns to investment in information and knowledge (Stiglitz 2000) and the motivation for one to
share information with others. Thus this stream of research has pointed to the challenges in
transferring knowledge and information and thus the cost side of gaining visibility.
Under this stream of research, two sides of antecedents to information sharing have been
theorized. On the softer side, social and human factors have been evoked. As information sharing
involved a sender and a receiver in its process, such factors include the characteristics of the
sender and the receiver as well as their relationship environment. For example, such factors
include the sender’s capability to interpret and transfer the information or knowledge, the
receiver’s capability to interpret and absorb the information, and the relationship sentiment over

33

their relationship (Szulanski 1996; von Hippel 1994). On the harder side, however, more
mechanistic or vehicular factors are involved. Research under this stream, for example, usually
evoked factors related to channels for transferring information (e.g. Mohr & Nevin 1990) and IT
systems or environment for information exchange (e.g. Tippins & Sohi 2003; Wu et al 2006).
Because visibility involves access to the information to be shared from a partner, to represent the
two sides I examine absorptive capacity and IT integration as the antecedents to visibility in this
dissertation. I turn to the discussions on each concept next.
2.5. Absorptive Capacity
On the softer side of antecedents to visibility, absorptive capacity in this dissertation can be
defined as the ability of a firm to value and assimilate the external knowledge and information
related to its trading partner. In this case, it is the ability of the buying firm to absorb knowledge
and information regarding its supplier. The following sections will be discussions on the concept
definition and its components.
2.5.1. Absorptive Capacity as a Relationship-Specific Construct
Most studies related to absorptive capacity have cited and defined it with regard to the original
definition by Cohen and Levinthal (cf. Zahra & George 2002). Under this stream of research, the
concept of absorptive capacity can be defined as a firm’s ability “to recognize the value of new,
external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal
1990, p. 128). This definition, however, may contain in itself at least two components which are
distinctive (cf. Zahra & George 2002). The first component includes the ability to value and to
assimilate external knowledge (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Lane & Lubatkin 1998). This
component, however, does not guarantee the ability to exploit the knowledge acquired for
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innovative products and services (Zahra & George 2002). The second one captures this latter
aspect and is a function of the abilities to transform and exploit (Zahra & George 2002) or
simply apply the new knowledge to commercial end (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). These
two components are distinctive but may correlate with each other because the former can be seen
as an antecedent to the latter (Zahra & George 2002).
The concept of absorptive capacity in this dissertation focuses on the first component of
recognizing the value and assimilating external knowledge and information. Focusing on this
component is appropriate because we do not examine innovation outcomes in this study which
has usually been associated with the second component of absorptive capacity (e.g. George et al
2001). Moreover, while absorptive capacity has been widely studied and linked to various
performance outcomes, the studies have usually reflected a firm’s capacity to apply received
knowledge to the commercial ends (i.e. the second component) with disproportionately less
attention paid to the capacity to value and assimilate the knowledge (i.e. the first component)
(Zahra & George 2002).
It should also be noted that the construct of absorptive capacity in this dissertation is a
relationship-specific one. I argue that a firm may work with different trading partners under
different environments or at least at different stages of a relationship. Thus it may have better
absorptive capacity toward one partner than the others. Conceptualizing absorptive capacity as
specific to a relationship or trading partner will be more accurate. The definition of absorptive
capacity in this dissertation thus bears similarity with the concept of relative rather than the
absolute absorptive capacity (Rebolledo, Halley, & Nagati 2009).
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2.5.2. Dimensions of Absorptive Capacity
While researchers seem to agree on the definition of absorptive capacity, different dimensions of
the capacity have been proposed and operationalized. For example, in innovation studies,
research and development (R&D) spending has usually been used as a proxy for absorptive
capacity (e.g. W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; George et al 2001). The argument is that firms
spend on R&D are usually better able to use externally available information and technical
change within an industry is often closed linked to a firm’s R&D activities (W. M. Cohen &
Levinthal 1990). Other authors invoked the same absorptive capacity definition by Cohen and
Levinthal but operationalized the construct differently depending on their research context. For
example, in an alliance study, Lane and Lubatkin proposed that absorptive capacity of a student
firm will depend on the relevance of the new knowledge, the similarity of student firm’s and
teacher firm’s structures, and shared research communities (Lane & Lubatkin 1998). In a jointventure study, Lyles and Salk, on the other hand, focused on the flexibility of international joint
venture structure when studied the absorptive capacity the ventures (Lyles & Salk 2007).
To be consistent with the original concept of absorptive capacity, I focus on two dimensions of
absorptive capacity which built on the original conceptualization by Cohen and Levinthal (1990).
First, a key dimension of absorptive capacity is prior knowledge. The knowledge may include
both the basic skills and most recent knowledge of scientific or technological development (W.
M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). The more diverse the prior knowledge a firm has, the more likely
that the new knowledge will be relevant to it. Past experience may also define the locus of a
firm’ knowledge search, and therefore influences the development of future knowledge
acquisition capabilities (Zahra & George 2002). Therefore, when the prior knowledge is
valuable, firms will rely on this knowledge to conduct business operations (Petersen, Pedersen,

36

& Lyles 2008). Second, a firm’s absorptive capacity will also depend on its individual members’
absorptive capacity (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Investment in the development of
individual employee’s absorptive capacity, therefore, will determine the organizational capacity.
Above of all, it is this investment in employee training that could help each individual employee
to better acquire and assimilate new knowledge (Phan et al 2006; Zahra & George 2002).
These two dimensions may not be so distinctive because prior knowledge of an organization may
also be a function of the prior knowledge of its employees. Thus both of the dimensions could be
examined when measuring absorptive capacity. The dimensions examined here also match with
the concept of potential absorptive capacity by Zahra and George as they could represent both
the abilities to acquire and to assimilate new knowledge from external sources (cf. Zahra &
George 2002).
The importance of absorptive capacity as a capability has been noted in various fields of
management including strategic management, technology management, international business,
and organizational economics (George et al 2001; Zahra & George 2002), explaining
organizational phenomena at multiple levels of analysis and invoking different theories including
the organizational learning, industrial economics, resource-based view, and dynamic capabilities
(see Zahra & George 2002 for a review). The contention under this stream of research is that
firms with high absorptive capacity can reduce the cost of valuing and assimilating external
knowledge for achieving better performance. Thus we have reasons to believe that a buyer firm
with high absorptive capacity can reduce the cost of valuing and assimilating information and
knowledge from its supplier, thus enhancing visibility into the supplier.
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2.6. IT Integration
On the mechanistic side of antecedents to visibility, I examine the construct of IT integration.
This construct as an important relationship-specific capability has been well studied in literature.
The next section thus briefly discusses the concept.
Information technology (IT) has long been touted as an important potential resource that could
help provide firms with higher performance and competitive advantage (e.g. Jean, Sinkovics, &
Cavusgil 2010; Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy 2008). Various IT based constructs have been
studied, including external IT integration or virtual integration (e.g. Grover & Saeed 2007; Wang
& Wei 2007), internal IT integration (e.g. Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy 2008; Ward & Zhou
2006), IT alignment and advancement (e.g. Wu et al 2006), and electronic integration (Jean,
Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010). In this dissertation, I focus on IT integration, which could be
defined as the extent of compatibility of IT systems that enable partners’ common operations and
collaboration. The IT systems may contain both the hardware and the software systems of the
two trading partners. In this study, the partners are a buyer and its supplier for a particular item
sourced. Thus our definition matches with the concepts of external IT integration, virtual
integration, between-firm IT integration, or electronic integration (Grover & Saeed 2007; Jean,
Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010; Ward & Zhou 2006)1.
The inter-firm literature has shed light on the importance of IT integration to multiple
performance results. For example, IT integration has been proven to help firms successfully
apply the practices of postponement (Hoek 1998) and just-in-time strategies (Ward & Zhou
2006); enhance supply chain capabilities, including the ability to coordinate and exchange
1

The concept of IT integration here is at an aggregate rather than a more granular level as might be conceptualized
by others (e.g. Rai, Patnayakuni, & Seth 2006)
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information of high quality (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; Wu et al 2006); flexibility
(Swafford, Ghosh, & Murthy 2008; Wang & Wei 2007); result in shorter customer lead time
(Ward & Zhou 2006); and facilitate the cooperativeness and monitoring activities among
partners (Jean, Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010).
The theoretical reasoning for all the above links is that IT integration is an important resource
that may help reduce the cost of transferring information among the partners involved (Hoek
1998) and therefore facilitate the partners in reconfiguring their operations for better
performance. Thus we have reasons to believe that for a buying firm, IT integration with its
supplier can help it gain better visibility into the supplier.
2.7. Potential Moderators: Supplier’s Market Dynamism and Goodwill Trust
A model would be more robust when we examine the moderators or contextual influences on the
model relationships. As a buyer working with its supplier will usually have to evaluate not only
the internal environment of the relationship but also the external one, we have reasons to believe
that the environment may affect the relationships between variables in our model. Drawn on
extant literature, in this dissertation I examine two moderators as the environmental context for
the relationships in the model: supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust. Both have well
been discussed in the inter-firm literature. In the next section, therefore, I briefly discuss
supplier’s market dynamism first. Next will be a discussion of goodwill trust of a buyer on its
supplier.
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2.7.1. Supplier’s Market Dynamism
The external environment where the supplier is working may directly influence the ability of the
supplier to make sense of its environment and thus its respective strategies and behaviors.
Indirectly, the environment can influence the ability of the buyer to make sense of the
information and knowledge about its supplier. In this dissertation, I examine supplier’s market
dynamism which I refer to here as the degree of unanticipated changes in the supplier’s external
environment (cf. Bello & Gilliland 1997). High degree of supplier’s market dynamism lowers
the ability of the firm partners to predict future contingencies in the external environment
surrounding it (Bello & Gilliland 1997). Our definition matches with the concepts of external
uncertainty-volatility (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990) and the environment unpredictability
(Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). For example, Klein et al. distinguished volatility dimension of
external uncertainty with diversity and refers volatility to “the extent at which the environment
changes rapidly and allows a firm to be caught by surprise” (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990, p.
200). Other authors also stressed the changes with unpredictability nature of the construct (e.g.
Rindfleisch & Heide 1997).
Market dynamism is one of the key constructs in transaction cost analysis perspective (cf.
Williamson 1993; Williamson 1991). Under this view, market dynamism has been attributed to
giving rise to the adaptation problems (see Rindfleisch & Heide 1997 for more details) because
under such volatile environment, firms are unable to predict future, making it difficult for them
to plan and write contingent contracts (Bello & Gilliland 1997). Volatile environment therefore
could lead to higher transaction costs, resulting in firms to favor internal integration (S. Klein,
Frazier, & Roth 1990) and prevent exporting firms to flexibly adapt to changes (Bello &
Gilliland 1997). Thus we have reasons to believe that supplier’s market dynamism may influence
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the paths to visibility because information is imperfect and obtaining it will entail transaction
costs (Lamming, Caldwell, & Harrison 2004; Lamming et al 2001; Stiglitz 2000).
2.7.2. Goodwill Trust
Trust could be an important relational construct that represents not only the motivations for
exchange parties but also the relational environment governing their relationship (McEvily,
Perrone, & Zaheer 2003). In this dissertation, I focus on buyer’s goodwill trust, which could be
defined as the buying firm’s beliefs and expectations that its supplier will exhibit intentions and
actions that are in good faith (cf. Das & Teng 2001).
The notion of trust here is examined from the trustor’s perspective (i.e. buyer) toward the
intentions and behaviors of the trustee (i.e. supplier). It is important to note that I only focus on
trust at the attitudinal level. In fact, trust has been studied in literature at different levels
including belief or expectation (e.g. Lui & Ngo 2004; Morgan & Hunt 1994; Nooteboom,
Berger, & Noorderhaven 1997), intentional level (e.g. Ganesan 1994; Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman 1995; McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003), and behavioral level (e.g. Moorman,
Zaltman, & Deshpande 1992; Robson, Katsikeas, & Bello 2008). However, while trust at the
belief and intention levels may not be separable, they are distinguishable from the behavioral
level. This is because, on the one hand, as Moorman et al. put it “if one believes that a partner is
trustworthy without being willing to rely on that partner, trust is limited” (Moorman, Zaltman, &
Deshpande 1992, p. 315). Morgan and Hunt, therefore, acknowledge that “willingness to rely
should be viewed as an outcome…of trust” but proposed that willingness is unnecessary or
redundant in the definition of trust because “one could not label a trading partner as ‘trustworthy’
if one were not willing to take actions that otherwise would entail risk” (Morgan & Hunt 1994, p.
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23). On the other hand, intentional trust may lead to behavioral trust but cannot be inferred from
the trust behaviors alone. Actions of trust could depend on other reasons than trust intention such
as the trustor’s dependence on the trustee (Lui & Ngo 2004; Nooteboom, Berger, &
Noorderhaven 1997). Thus belief and intentional trust should be considered together as
attitudinal and separate from behavioral trust.
Inter-firm literature has touted trust as an important organizing principle (cf. McEvily, Perrone,
& Zaheer 2003) . The organizing principle here can be understood as the logic by which
information is gathered, disseminated, and interpreted within and between organizations and
behaviors and routines are selected to coordinate actions (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003;
Zander & Kogut 1995). McEvily et al. (2003) integrated works on inter-firm trust and proposed
that like other organizational principles such as clan, market, and hierarchy (Ouchi 1979), trust
could represent the way of solving problems related to interdependence and uncertainty. This is
because trust could influence organizing through two causal pathways: structuring and
mobilizing. For example, trust can shape the stable and enduring interaction patterns within and
between organizations. Trust can also mobilize resources or motivate actors to contribute,
combine, and coordinate resources for collective purposes.
Thus, trust has been found to lead to different positive organizational outcomes including, for
example, less conflict, more satisfaction, and higher commitment to the relationship with trading
partners (James C. Anderson & Narus 1990; Mohr & Spekman 1994; Morgan & Hunt 1994),
lower probability of loss when dealing with a partner (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven
1997), lower likelihood to switch trading partner (Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza 2004), higher
performance in an alliance or trading relationships (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009; Robson,
Katsikeas, & Bello 2008). As a moderator, goodwill trust has also been found as a substitute for
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contractual control to enhance performance satisfaction in architect-contractor partnership (Lui
& Ngo 2004). For the above reasons, it may be logical to suspect that goodwill trust may be able
to substitute visibility as an important organizing principle to mitigate supplier risk.
In summary, this chapter provided a literature review for the constructs in our model. For the
main model, perceived supplier risk has been discussed as the dependent variable that needs to
be explained. Three information-based capabilities including visibility, absorptive capacity, and
IT integration then were discussed. Two potential moderators also included in the model are
supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust. The resource-based view and relational view
have been discussed as the overall framework bonding all the links together. Next chapter will
discuss each pathway in the model in more details to formulate hypotheses.

CHAPTER III. MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
The conceptual and operational model in this dissertation takes the resource-based view and
relational view as the overarching theoretical lens. In particular, in this model, I provide the links
between information-based capabilities including absorptive capacity, IT integration, and
visibility to performance as perceived supplier risk. My overall perspective is that a buying firm
who develops the relationship-specific capabilities can mitigate supplier risk better.
Moreover, adding to the nuance of the theoretical view, I posit the pathways via visibility which
absorptive capacity and IT integration will operate to influence perceived supplier risk. I also
examine contextual effects on the relationships in the model with two potential moderators:
supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust. Thus this chapter will start with the main model
relationships. Next I discuss and hypothesize the contextual effects on the main model. This
chapter is concluded with some discussion on control variables for the model.
3.1. Main Model
3.1.1. Visibility and Perceive Supplier Risks
As discussed earlier, previous literature has linked some structural or environmental factors to
perceived supplier risk (e.g. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010). I add to the resource-based and
relational view literature by positing that visibility could be the key information-based capability
that helps reduce perceived supplier risk. In particular, I posit that visibility is the key to reduce
the uncertainty element of the supplier risk. This is because two mechanisms may operate here.
First, a buyer with a high degree of supplier visibility will have accurate, updated, and relevant
information and knowledge of both the supplier’s operational and strategic issues. Thus it has the
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ability to predict and then act proactively against potentially disruptions from its supplier. Access
to both types of information is critical for reducing supplier risk. For example, operational
information may concern the deployment of input resources such as inventory and production
plan. Having an updated and accurate access to the information could help the buying firm
optimize input resources by streamlining buffers and resource allocation (R. Klein & Rai 2009)
to guard against the possibility of supply disruption from the supplier. Similarly, the strategic
information from its supplier involves issues such as the financial status, margin and cost
structures, and competitive positioning of the supplier. Such accurate information, when
accessed in a timely manner, can help the buying firm reconfigure its resources and coordinate
operational activities to match with potential strategic changes (R. Klein & Rai 2009). Thus the
buying firm can lower the possibility of being caught up with surprising changes from the
supplier and its market environment. Therefore, having access to the operational and strategic
information, the buying firm would be able to know what is happening, and more importantly,
what may happen. The degree of uncertainty over the item supply from its supplier thus will
decrease as a buyer has higher visibility into its supplier.
The above line of argument could be supported by some anecdotal empirical evidence in
literature. For example, Lee et al. (1997; 2004) found that shared internal data from its partner
could help a firm in a supply chain better able to forecast inventory levels. Sharing operational
information, therefore, may help reduce potential operational problems in supply chain
(Wareham et al 2005). On the other hand, sharing strategic information could enhance supply
chain flexibilities (Wang & Wei 2007) because as relevant information is acquired in a timely
manner, firms in the chain could adapt to changes in the environment and changes from other
partners.
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Second, high supplier visibility may provide good bases for control ability or at least the illusion
of control (Das & Teng 2001). This is because having visibility into operational and strategic
information of the supplier could facilitate a buying firm to monitor supplier outputs and to
understand the processes, resources, and capabilities of the supplier. Such process knowledge
and output measurability are necessary for implementing output and behavior controls (Ouchi
1979). In its turn, the ability to control output and behaviors will reduce the uncertainty over the
item supply because it would be perceived easy now to apply safeguarding tactics (Stump &
Heide 1996) and it creates the sense of confidence (Christopher & Lee 2004). Thus high
visibility into its supplier will reduce uncertainty over item supply by providing good bases for
control.
This line of argument has been supported by some empirical evidence. For example, Mohr et al.
(1996) found that collaborative communication between channel members are positively
associated with the uses of control by manufacturers over their dealers. McEvily and Marcus
(2005) found that information sharing between exchange partners enhances their abilities to
jointly control problems which may arise. Corroborating the above arguments and evidence, I
formally hypothesize that:
H1: For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will reduce Perceived Supplier Risk.
In its turn, visibility can be realized by two other information-based capabilities: absorptive
capacity and IT integration. Absorptive capacity represents the softer side of antecedents to
visibility. IT integration, on the other hand, represents the mechanistic side. I discuss each one
next.
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3.1.2. Absorptive Capacity and Visibility
A buying firm with higher potential absorptive capacity is more able than others to value and
assimilate external knowledge (cf. W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Lane & Lubatkin 1998). I,
therefore, posit that buyer’s potential absorptive capacity may give rise to the buyer’s supplier
visibility into its supplier. This is because absorptive capacity lowers the cost of valuing and
assimilating supplier’s information and knowledge. In particular, each dimension of absorptive
capacity as discussed could enhance the supplier visibility as follow.
First, one premise of absorptive capacity is that the firm has prior related knowledge to value and
assimilate new knowledge (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). As learning is cumulative, the
learning efficiency is greatest when the object to learn is related to what is already known
(Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles 2008). Learning is usually much more difficult in novel domains
(W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). A buyer firm with substantial prior related knowledge about
the supplier and the supplier’s business environment, therefore, are more able to absorb relevant
and updated knowledge from the supplier whether it is operational or strategic. Thus a buying
firm with prior related knowledge over its supplier will have higher visibility into the supplier.
Empirically, Petersen et al. (2008) found that the degree that a firm could rely on prior
knowledge when doing business in a foreign market is negatively associated with the knowledge
gap between what the firm has and what is needed for accomplishing foreign business venture in
the market.
Second, absorptive capacity may depend on the prior investment in individual absorptive
capacities (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Such investment effort could be measured by
investment in training the firm’s employees (Phan et al 2006). As the employees are equipped
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with better abilities to learn new knowledge via training, they could overcome the barriers to
knowledge transfer (Simonin & Özsomer 2009). Investment in training employees, therefore,
may facilitate a buying firm to acquire knowledge regarding the supplier’s business issues such
as the supplier’s resources, capabilities, and its strategic position. Such updated knowledge may
also help the buyer’s employees interpret new operational information from the supplier in a
more accurate, relevant, and timely manner. Thus the updated operational and strategic
knowledge transferred from a supplier can be absorbed easily if a buying firm invested
adequately in its employees.
Empirically, it has been found that capacity to learn and investment in training are positively
related to knowledge acquisition by an affiliate firm from its foreign parent (Lyles & Salk 2007).
Investment in training employees was also found to facilitate knowledge acquisition by a firm’s
employees from their joint-venture partner (Phan et al 2006). Corroborating the above arguments
and evidence, therefore, I formally hypothesize that:
H2: For a buying firm, Absorptive Capacity will increase Visibility into its supplier.
3.1.3. IT Integration and Visibility
On the mechanistic side, IT integration with a supplier can also enhance buyer’s visibility into
the supplier. This is because information technology could be utilized to lower costs in external
search, monitoring, and distribution of information (Hoek 1998). Thus IT integration lowers the
cost of transferring information and reduces the needed time for sharing information from the
supplier. In particular, when trading partners integrate with each other electronically, their IT
systems are aligned (Wu et al 2006), providing them with common supporting operations to
exchange the standardized and institutionalized information faster and more efficiently (Wang &

48

Wei 2007). Thus IT integration will smooth out the flow of active information within and across
firms (Wu et al 2006) and therefore could encourage partners to share information which may
have not been available (Wang & Wei 2007). In its turn, sharing information faster and more
efficiently provides firm partners with necessary condition to be efficient in gathering accurate,
relevant, and updated information (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006). Therefore, IT integration
could make the flow of goods transparent (Hoek 1998) and enhance visibility into its supplier.
Empirically, it has been found that interfirm system integration could lead to better quality of
information exchanged (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006). IT alignment was also found to
facilitate supply chain to increase the amount of information exchange (Wu et al 2006). More
recently, it has been found in the international inter-firm setting that electronic integration helps
customer monitor the supplier output and behaviors (Jean, Sinkovics, & Cavusgil 2010).
For the above theoretical reasons and empirical evidence, I posit that IT integration could
increase supplier visibility. Formally, I hypothesize that:
H3: For a buying firm, IT Integration with its supplier will increase Visibility into its supplier.
It should be noted that the above arguments and empirical evidence related to IT integration may
only be applicable to explicit and codified information (Nonaka 1994) that would be shared from
the supplier to its buyer. While important, the application of IT in integrating partner operations
requires the information to be structured, codified (R. Klein & Rai 2009), standardized, and
institutionalized to be transferred in a cost-effective manner (Wang & Wei 2007). In fact, all the
empirical studies regarding IT integration reported above operationalized information exchange
or monitoring only in terms of the structured and codified information (cf. Jean, Sinkovics, &
Cavusgil 2010; Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006; Wu et al 2006). For this reason, the effect of
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IT integration on visibility may be limited compared to the influence of absorptive capacity. In
general, IT integration only influences visibility by providing a good channel for transferring
standardized and codified information.
3.1.4. Mediation Role of Visibility
Literature employing the resource-based or relational views usually does not clarify which
capabilities or resources may be more important than the others. However, such distinction is
important because some capabilities may only operate via the others in influencing performance
(Zahra & George 2002). Thus the former capabilities only provide the necessary, not the
sufficient, conditions for gaining higher performance. The latter capabilities will play the key
role in achieving competitive advantage. Identifying and testing the configuration of capabilities
and resources under which some capabilities will operate via the others in influencing
performance therefore are important to explain why some firms even with high
capabilities/resources may not obtain higher competitive advantage. The theoretical and practical
focus thus would be on the mediation capabilities which would help explain better differential
performances among firms.
In this dissertation, absorptive capacity and IT integration are positioned as the informationbased capabilities that may influence perceived supplier risk but only indirectly and via visibility.
Thus I emphasize the role of visibility as the key capability that would help mitigate supplier risk
proactively. This is because absorptive capacity and IT integration only provide the necessary
conditions for the buyer to receive knowledge and for supplier to transfer information via
reducing the costs of absorbing and transferring the knowledge or information, respectively. It is
the visibility, which is the outcome of such information receiving and transferring, that will
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determine the perceived supplier risk. This argument parallels the logic for the distinction
between potential absorptive capacity and realized absorptive capacity in influencing innovation
outcomes (cf. Zahra & George 2002). Similarly, IT alignment is posited to only influence supply
chain capabilities which in turn will impact the chain performances (Wu et al 2006). Thus to test
this line of argument empirically, I formally hypothesize:
H4a. For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate the relationship between its
Absorptive Capacity and Perceived Supplier Risk.
H4b. For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate the relationship between the
firms’ IT Integration and Perceived Supplier Risk.
3.2. Moderation
In this dissertation, I explored the moderation role of two environmental factors: supplier’s
market dynamism and goodwill trust. In particular, I suspect that supplier’s market dynamism
will moderate the relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility. Goodwill trust, on the
other hand, may moderate the relationship between visibility and perceived supplier risk. I
discuss each one next.
3.2.1. Supplier’s Market Dynamism as Moderator
A volatile environment results in higher transaction costs (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990).
Given the fact that information exchange and obtaining visibility entail costs, the environment
dynamism may influence the pathways that lead to visibility. I posit that supplier’s market
dynamism may weaken the relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility. This is
because such dynamic environment may dampen the cost-saving effects of absorptive capacity
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for valuing and assimilating supplier’s knowledge and information. This line of argument could
be explored from both sides of trading partners.
From the supplier side, when a supplier is working under a highly dynamic environment, its
ability to make sense of the environment is reduced. This is because such volatile environment
makes it harder for the firm to predict future (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990) and anticipate all
the relevant future contingencies (Bello & Gilliland 1997). The supplier, therefore, will face with
difficulties in making long-range plans and decisions (Bello & Gilliland 1997). It may be better
for the firm then to create structures for sequential and adaptive decision making (S. Klein,
Frazier, & Roth 1990). The adaptive nature for strategic decisions from the supplier then makes
it harder for the supplier to integrate information and knowledge before transferring to the buyer
in an accurate and timely manner.
From the buyer side, compared to a less dynamic environment, high dynamism in the supplier’s
external environment will make the previous knowledge by the buyer less relevant and related.
Moreover, training for the buyer’s employees is also more likely to be obsolete and irrelevant.
Highly dynamic environment thus usually disrupts the routinization necessary for shared
understandings between distant trading partners (Bello & Gilliland 1997). Thus under such
circumstance, it is difficult for buyer firm to develop routines to capture the external information
from its supplier (Anand & Ward 2004).
We can expect, therefore, that the supplier’s market dynamism will hamper the effect of its
buyer’s absorptive capacity to realize its visibility into the supplier. Formally I hypothesize that:
H5. For a buying firm, the Supplier’s Market Dynamism will negatively moderate the
relationship between Absorptive Capacity and Visibility such that when Supplier’s Market
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Dynamism is high, the positive relationship between Absorptive Capacity and Visibility will be
weaker, compared to when Supplier’s Market Dynamism is low.
Note that, however, I do not posit the moderating effect of supplier’s market dynamism on the
relationship between IT integration and visibility. This is because the effect of IT integration on
visibility is realized via reducing the cost of transferring information and knowledge. The
supplier’s market condition, while it may influence the cost of integrating and absorbing
information, may not have a significant effect on this kind of transferring cost. The market
condition therefore may not moderate the relationship between IT integration and visibility.
3.2.2. Goodwill Trust as Moderator
Goodwill trust is the second moderator that may have an effect on our model relationships. In
this dissertation, I posit that goodwill trust may substitute for visibility and thus reduce the effect
of visibility on perceived supplier risk. This happens because of the following mechanisms.
First, a firm who trusts its partner may have less fear of being exploited (Geyskens et al 1996;
Gilliland & Bello 2002). A buying firm trusting its supplier thus may be free of concerns over
opportunistic intention and behaviors by the partner (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009). Even
when disruptions may occur then, the trusting buyer may believe its supplier will act on its
behalf to reduce the potential damaging effect of such disruptions on the buyer. Therefore, when
trust is high, visibility may not be necessary for a buyer in forecasting and predicting what may
happen to prevent potential risks from its supplier. Empirically, Morgan and Hunt (1994) found
that attitudinal trust of retailer on its supplier enhances the perception that the retailer is able to
predict the consequences of decisions to be made and the confidence in those decisions when
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working with its supplier. Thus buyer’s goodwill trust may substitute visibility in enhancing its
perceived ability to forecast and then to act against disruptions.
Second, trust and formal control may act as the substitute to each other in mitigating supplier
risk. This is because trust could be considered as the informal control while contract as the
formal one which covers potential contingencies (R. Klein & Rai 2009). Firms with high trusting
beliefs on their partners usually reduce or eliminate the necessity for covering all contingencies
(R. Klein & Rai 2009). Goodwill trust, therefore, usually reduce the need to install contractual
safeguarding mechanisms against opportunism (Lui & Ngo 2004). In the same vein, I posit that a
trusting firm may have the sense of better control ability over its supplier because safeguarding
mechanisms are not necessary. Thus high trust may make visibility less necessary in this regard.
Goodwill trust, therefore, may substitute for visibility in providing control ability or a sense of it
to mitigate supplier risk. Empirically, in the contractor partnership setting, Lui and Ngo (2004)
found that goodwill trust actually could substitute for contractual control to influence cooperative
outcomes.
Corroborating the above lines of arguments and empirical evidence, we have reasons to believe
that goodwill trust can substitute visibility for mitigating supplier risk. Formally, I hypothesize
that:
H6. For a buying firm, Goodwill Trust will negatively moderate the relationship between
Visibility and Perceived Supplier Risk such that when Goodwill Trust is high, the negative
relationship between Visibility and Perceived Supplier Risk will be weaker, compared to when
Goodwill Trust is low.
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A summary of the hypotheses for the model in this dissertation can be found in Figure 3-1. To
control for potential spurious effects I also include control variables for both perceived supplier
risk and visibility when testing the model which I will discuss next.
3.3. Control Variables
Benefiting from previous theoretical arguments and empirical studies, I include several control
variables in the model. In particular, for visibility as the dependent variable, I include supplier’s
market dynamism as a control variable. This is because the supplier’s market dynamism may
increase the transaction costs in general (S. Klein, Frazier, & Roth 1990) and the buyer’s cost of
accessing information regarding the supplier in particular. Thus high supplier’s market
dynamism may reduce the buyer’s visibility into its supplier.
For perceived supplier risk as the dependent variable, I control for supplier’s market dynamism,
buyer’s goodwill trust, relationship duration, and supplier’s substitutability. First, supplier’s
market dynamism may increase perceived supplier risk because it makes the potential of
disruptions from the market more likely. These possible disruptions in turn may affect the
supplier and thus highlights the possibility of disruptions from the supplier. Empirically, Ellis et
al. found that technological uncertainty increases the probability of disruptions from a supplier
(Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010).
Second, the mere fact that a buying firm has been working with its supplier for a long time may
already mean that the relationship is worth continuing and that the supplier may be reliable in
providing the needed item to the buyer. Thus relationship duration may reduce the perceived
supplier risk.
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Supplier’s
Market
Dynamism

Goodwill Trust

H5 (-)

H6 (+)

Absorptive
Capacity

H2 (+)
Visibility

Perceived
Supplier Risk

H1 (-)

H3 (+)
IT Integration

Notes:
- Expected sign for the hypotheses in the brackets.
- Signs in the bracket for the hypotheses about
moderating effects are for the interaction term.
- Hypotheses 4a and b are for meditational effect and
not presented here.
- Control variables are not presented here.
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Third, buyer’s goodwill trust may help reduce perceived supplier risk. This is because trust in a
partner may act as the informal control over the partner and enhance the perception of ability to
predict the partner’s intention and behaviors. Empirically, a firm’s trust on a partner has been
found to lower probability of loss when dealing with the partner (Nooteboom, Berger, &
Noorderhaven 1997). Trust was also found to enhance the perceived ability of a firm to predict
the consequences of its decisions to be made and the confidence in those decisions when
working with its partner (Morgan & Hunt 1994).
Finally, supplier’s substitutability is included to as a control variable for perceived supplier risk.
In the previous study, Ellis et al. (2010) found that the number of alternative suppliers for a
particular item to the buyer reduces the probability of disruptions from the supplier. Thus I
include this variable as a control variable to be consistent with previous findings for the
comparison purpose.
In short, this chapter elaborated on the relationships in the model. In the first section, I discussed
and formally hypothesized the relationships among absorptive capacity, IT integration, and
visibility in their paths to supplier risk. In the later section, I posited the potential moderating
effects of supplier’s market dynamism and goodwill trust on the relationships in the main model.
Control variables were included in the model to prevent the potential of interpreting spurious
effects. In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology and model analysis and the results for the
hypotheses formalized in this chapter.

CHAPTER IV. INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT AND MODEL TESTING
To test the structural model, reliable and valid instruments must be developed. The instrument
measures include (1) Absorptive Capacity; (2) IT Integration; (3) Supplier’s Market Dynamism;
(4) Goodwill Trust; (5) Visibility; and (6) Perceived Supplier Risk. All the instruments except
Visibility are adapted from previous articles in the field. Since there have been no validated
measures used in the literature for the construct of visibility in this dissertation, the measure for
the construct is newly developed in this study. The development of all the instruments followed
three steps: (1) item generation; (2) expert review; and (3) a large-scale survey analysis.
4.1. Item generation
The objective of this step is to generate the needed items for the construct by extensively
reviewing the literature. The measurement items should cover the domain of the construct
measured (Churchill Jr 1979; Moore & Benbasat 1991). To generate measurement items for each
construct in the study, prior research was extensively reviewed and an initial list of potential
items was compiled. The objective here was to generate as many different items as possible to
measure the constructs based on their definitions. Except for the construct of Supplier’s Market
Dynamism, which has been measured in extant literature by seven-point semantic scale, other
constructs are measured with seven-point Likert scale with one as Strongly Disagree and seven
as Strongly Agree. Items for the constructs were generated as reflective because the constructs
are theorized to lead to the relevant items (Jarvis et al 2003). The construct items were generated
as follows.

57

58

4.1.1. Absorptive Capacity
Measurement items for the construct of absorptive capacity were generated based on the
conceptualization of the construct (W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Zahra & George 2002). The
items are adapted from the item pool in previous articles (Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles 2008;
Phan et al 2006). It should be noted that these items tap into domain of the capacity to value and
assimilate knowledge from a supplier which is related to the potential rather than the realized
absorptive capacity (Zahra & George 2002).
4.1.2. IT Integration
Measurement items for IT integration were generated based on its original conceptualization of
the construct (Powell 1992; Wu et al 2006). Items for the construct are adapted from the items in
Wu et al. (2006) which tap into the alignment of computer systems of two partners in a channel
which comprises the potential for the partners’ IT integration. The items were adapted for this
dissertation to take the buyer’s view in the relationship with its supplier.
4.1.3. Supplier’s Market Dynamism
Measurement items for the construct of supplier’s market dynamism were generated based on
item pool from articles with similar concepts such as external uncertainty (S. Klein, Frazier, &
Roth 1990), market dynamism (McGinnis & Kohn 1993), and market volatility (Bello &
Gilliland 1997). The items were adapted to tap into the dynamism degree of the market
surrounding the supplier.
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4.1.4. Goodwill Trust
Measurement items for the construct of goodwill trust were generated and adapted based on its
conceptualization as benevolence (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009; R. Klein & Rai 2009) or
goodwill trust (Das & Bing-Sheng 1998; Das & Teng 2001). The items for the construct were
adapted from item pool in previous articles (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello 2009; R. Klein & Rai
2009) to tap into the concept of trust from a buyer on its supplier.
4.1.5. Visibility
Measurement items for the construct of visibility were newly generated for this study because
there have been no validated items in previous articles that fully capture the construct domain.
As noted in previous section, extant articles instead have operationalized the construct of
information sharing (e.g. Heide & Miner 1992; McEvily & Marcus 2005; Noordewier, John, &
Nevin 1990) or information flows (e.g. R. Klein & Rai 2009) or measured the quality of logistic
information (e.g. Hult et al 2006; Zhou & Benton Jr 2007). Thus in this dissertation, new items
were generated to tap into both operational and strategic domain of information exchanged and
three elements of information efficacy including accuracy, relevance, and timeliness.
4.1.6. Perceived Supplier Risk
Measurement items for the construct of perceived supplier risk were generated based on its
definition and conceptualization which tap into the domain of the supplier risk due to disruptions
on the supplier’s side. Items for the construct were adapted from the item pool in previous
articles (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010; Wagner & Bode 2008, 2006; Zsidisin & Ellram 2003).
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In summary, for the six constructs, 50 items have been generated (see Appendix A). The items
then were subjected to an extensive review from academic and industrial experts before largescale surveys for a quantitative analysis.
4.2. Expert Review
After measurement items were created through rigorous and extensive review of literature, the
common pool of items together with their definitions were provided to academic and industrial
experts to pre-assess the content or face validity of the measures (Churchill Jr 1979). Experts
provided feedbacks and suggestions for wording and relevance of the items used for each
construct through an iterative process. The objective here was to ensure the content validity of
the constructs and to use as few items as possible so that they still cover adequately the domain
of the constructs with minimum redundancy. Still, new items were added when necessary. All
the measurement items were followed through this process even though most of them have been
used and adapted from validly and reliably established scales in extant literature.
The final questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. In the beginning of the survey
questionnaire, respondents are directed to think about one of the key international suppliers and a
key item that they are sourcing from the supplier. Respondents are told to note down the key
item before they could continue the survey. For all the questions in the survey, respondents are
reminded of the key supplier and the key item that they are referring to in the beginning.
Questions are arranged in the questionnaire so that independent variables will be measured
before the dependent variables and easy and less sensitive questions will be asked first. The
questionnaire concludes with some questions about demographics and any further comments
from the respondents.
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4.3. Quantitative Analysis of Measurement
4.3.1. Sampling Design
Respondents should have knowledge and experience in working with an international supplier
and their firms’ operation and performance. Thus the target respondents are senior buyers or
managers (e.g. CEOs, presidents, vice presidents, directors, or managers) for manufacturing
firms in the U.S. whose job responsibilities are in the area of purchasing, procurement, and
supply chain management. To achieve a greater generalizability, 11 different SIC codes are
covered as in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. SIC Code for Survey
SIC
200
250
270
280
300
340
350
360
370
380
390

Industries
Food & kindred products
Furniture and fixtures
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Rubber & misc. plastic products
Fabricated metal products
Machinery, except electrical
Electric/electronic equipment
Transportation equipment
Instruments & related products
Misc. manufacturing industries

A list of 5,000 addresses was obtained from the database of Institute for Supply Management
(ISM), a prestigious association of professionals in the area of supply chain management from
different industries across the U.S. Under its new policy, however, ISM only provided the post
mailing list. No emails or phone numbers were provided for direct contacts.
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4.3.2. Data Collection
To increase the potential participation rate, 5,000 post mails were sent to the respondents inviting
them to participate in the survey with either option: (1) taking the survey using paper-based
questionnaire or (2) taking the survey online. Respondents are promised to have a summary of
the result reports on procurement risk as a token of appreciation for their time and cooperation.
In fact, we prefer the survey to be administered online because the Internet not only increases the
richness of information but also enhances the reach of information (Laudon & Laudon 2009).
The purpose of using Web survey is to reach as many respondents as possible and to retrieve as
much information as possible in short time (Crawford et al 2002). The survey is sponsored by
Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) at Georgia State University.
The whole process of data collection was carried out for six months from February 2011 to
August 2011. In total, 121 agreed to take the survey online and thus provided their email
addresses. Only nine agreed to take the survey off-line (i.e. using paper-based questionnaire).
The effective sampling frame thus is 130. Among the 5,000 sent out, about 213 post mails were
returned with no existing addresses or the respondents had moved. Nine responded to refuse to
participate because they already retired or their firms do not source from outside the U.S.
Given the fact that respondents are managers at high level and working with international
suppliers, they are usually very busy and working around the clock. To improve the completion
rate, two rounds of emails were sent to invite respondents to complete the survey. In the first
round, 121 respondents were sent emails with reminders two or three times a week to participate
online. The nine respondents who prefer taking the survey off-line were sent the paper-based
questionnaires with pre-posted return envelops. About seven respondents after reading the
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invitation emails responded that they are no longer in the procurement position or not sourcing
outside the U.S. After four months, the second round of survey was launched. In the second
round, all the respondents who haven’t responded or haven’t completed the survey in the first
round were sent a reminder by post mails. As in the first round, in the second round, respondents
who prefer taking the survey online were sent reminders two or three times a week.
In total, we have 90 respondents who started the survey among which 64 completed online and
two completed off-line. 24 respondents started the survey but did not complete it. The effective
response rate is thus 69 percent while the effective completion rate is 50 percent. Some sample
characteristics are provided in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2. Sample Characteristics
N
Relationship Duration (Years)
Firm Size (Number of employees)
Percentage of firm's total procurement
budget allocated for the key supplier
Total firm’s sales last year (USD millions)

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std.

66
66

0.25
9.00

40
400000

9.72
20844.77

8.28
57156.33

65

0.00

60

9.26

11.09

61

0.00

100000

6849.63

15842.77

Several sample characteristics should be noted. For example, all respondents are holding the
position of high-level managers related to procurement and/or supply chain including, for
example, vice president of supply chain management, senior buyer, purchasing director, global
strategic sourcing director, purchasing director, etc. Moreover, on average, respondents have
been working with the key supplier almost ten years and about nine percent of the buyer’s total
procurement budget has been allocated to its key supplier last year. It should be noted that the
key international suppliers that our respondent firms are sourcing from come from different
regions worldwide including Europe (e.g. EU, France, Germany, Belgium, Ukraine), Asia (e.g.
China, India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia), non-U.S. America (e.g. Mexico, Canada, Chile,

64

Brazil), and Australia and New Zealand. The buying firm size ranges from 9 to 400,000
employees with the average of 20,845 employees worldwide.
After further examining the firm size distribution, however, two firms were found to be of
extraordinarily big in size with 200,000 and 400,000 employees, outside the three standard
deviation of the sample mean of the firm size. Including the two firms in the sample may distort
the analysis result. Thus we can exclude the two big firms and do the analyses on the final
sample of 64. To test for robustness, however, the model with the sample of 66 is tested later to
compare the results. Analysis results in the following sections are reported for the sample of 64.
4.3.3. Non-Response Bias
ISM did not provide emails, phone numbers, or any other firm’s characteristics of the sampling
frame. Thus we could not contact its client firms personally to assess nonresponse bias.
Nevertheless, tests indicate that nonresponse bias is not likely an issue with our data. To do
these, the sample was divided into two batches by the median of the response point of time. Then
I compare means of firm characteristics between the early and late batches of the survey
responses (Armstrong & Overton 1977). As a result, I detected no differences across these
batches regarding the buyer-supplier relationship duration, firm size, percentage of firm's total
procurement budget allocated for the key supplier, and firm’s sales last year even at the 0.1
conservative significance level (see Table 4-3). Thus it could be inferred that nonresponse bias is
unlikely to be a significant issue in this study.
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Table 4-3. Non-Response Bias Test
Early Response
Compared Variables
Relationship Duration
(Years)
Firm Size (Employees)
Percentage of firm's total
procurement budget
allocated for the key
supplier
Total firm’s sales last
year (USD millions)

Late Response

Mean

N

Std.

Mean

N

Std.

8.73

31

8.41

11.81

31

7.935

9564.88 32
7.23

15699.37

32

4247.78 29

14677.47 32 27568.365

7.10

11.63

7366.24

6366.97

31

14.097

29 12822.091

ANOVA
F

Sig.

2.21 0.14
0.83 0.37
2.47 0.12

0.60 0.44

4.3.4. Measurement Validity and Reliability
Before testing the structural model, steps are taken to check (1) reliability; (2) discriminant
validity; and (3) convergent validity of the measures. The typical approach to assess reliabilities
is to use Cronbach’s α with threshold of 0.7 (Nunnally & Bernstein 1994). However, Cronbach’s
α is based on the restricted assumption of equal importance of all indicators. Following Hair et
al. (1998), the composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) of multiple
indicators of construct are also used to assess reliability of a construct. AVE is greater than 0.5
and CR is greater than 0.7 imply that the variance by trait is more than by error components
(Hair et al 1998). Items were deleted if it reduces the reliability of the construct and when it is
theoretically sound to do so. Results for Cronbach’s α, CR, and AVE for the finalized items are
reported in Table 4-6.
To test the discriminant validity of the constructs, I run exploratory factor analysis for the
construct items. The analysis result showed that all the items load cleanly on their components.
On overall, their loadings on the supposed components are larger than the loadings on other
components provide evidence for discriminant validity. Cross-loading items were deleted if it is
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theoretically sound to do so. The final factor analysis result is provided on Table 4-4. It should
also be noted that the items for strategic and operational visibility load on one common factor,
providing evidence that there may not be separate constructs of operational and strategic
visibility as some might theorize, at least in our data sample of U.S. manufacturing firms.
To further test for discriminant validity, I also compare inter-construct correlations with the
square root of average variance extracted (AVE) which indicates the percentage of overall
variance in the indicators captured by the latent construct (Hair et al 1998). Those comparisons
support discriminant validities for the measurement items in this study with square root of the
AVE for each construct measure exceeding correlations between the construct and other
constructs as we could see in Table 4-5.
Finally, convergent validity is an assessment of the consistency in measurements across different
operationalization. Following Fornell and Larcker (1981), I use AVE greater than 0.5 as the
threshold to confirm the convergent validity. Loadings of the items on the construct which is
equal or greater than 0.7 and significant also provide evidence for convergence validity of the
construct measures (Hair et al 1998). Items with low loadings were deleted if it is theoretically
sound to do so. Final results for item loadings are provided on Table 4-6, providing evidence for
convergent validity of the construct items. The final item inter-correlations are provided in the
Appendix B.
4.3.5. Common Method Bias
For a single-informant and cross-sectional study like this one, common method bias could be a
problem. To guard against such bias, steps have been taken ex ante and ex post (Podsakoff et al
2003).
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Table 4-4. Exploratory Factor Analysis Result
Measurement Items (after purification)
We commit resources to acquire new knowledge from our
key supplier.
We commit resources to understand our key supplier's
processes.
We invest in training our employees to make better use of
knowledge of our key supplier.
My firm’s IT system is compatible with our key supplier’s
IT system.
My firm’s IT system is aligned with our key supplier’s.

Component
3
4

1

2

5

6

0.05

0.20

0.80

0.11

-0.23

0.04

-0.04

0.35

0.67

-0.18

-0.38

0.12

0.22

0.17

0.81

-0.16

0.01

0.04

0.90

0.07

-0.02

-0.09

-0.10

0.04

0.91

0.14

0.11

-0.05

-0.05

0.14

0.91

0.08

0.05

0.02

0.05

0.11

0.92

0.02

0.08

0.05

0.02

0.07

My firm and our key supplier have invested in our IT
systems to make them interoperable.
Both my firm and our key supplier work together to
integrate our IT systems.
IT advances for supply chain communication system are
well aligned between my firm and our key supplier in
order to achieve the best supply chain performance.
Supplier Environment -Stable:Volatile

0.82

0.15

0.07

-0.05

-0.09

0.07

0.06

-0.13

0.02

0.92

0.16

-0.06

Supplier Environment -Certain:Uncertain

-0.07

-0.11

-0.06

0.92

0.09

-0.15

Supplier Environment -Predictable:Unpredictable

-0.08

0.11

-0.10

0.79

0.20

-0.02

We believe that our operational information about our key
supplier is accurate.
Overall, information regarding our key supplier’s
operations is available to us in a timely manner.
The operational information we have about our key
supplier is useful to improve our performance.
We have a good understanding of the resource and
capabilities of our key supplier.
We believe that the strategic information we have about
our key supplier is accurate.
The strategic information we have about our key supplier
is relevant to our business.
If our firm required assistance, our key supplier would do
its best to provide it.
Our key supplier is interested in our firm’s well-being, not
just its own.
In times of difficulty (e.g. shortages), our key supplier has
“gone out on a limb” for us.
Our key supplier does not have strong controls for
unexpected events.
Our key supplier is not capable of providing the key item
with consistent quality.
Our key supplier has the technological capability to ensure
stability in the supply of the key item (reverse).
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

0.16

0.51

-0.09

-0.17

-0.08

0.62

0.06

0.62

0.24

-0.01

-0.24

0.53

0.28

0.68

0.28

-0.09

0.03

0.09

0.10

0.76

0.15

-0.02

-0.32

0.18

0.11

0.81

0.14

-0.01

-0.19

0.21

0.03

0.89

0.14

-0.03

-0.14

0.18

-0.02

0.09

-0.09

-0.15

-0.20

0.86

0.18

0.20

0.22

-0.07

-0.04

0.85

0.16

0.23

0.08

0.02

-0.12

0.83

-0.12

-0.17

-0.22

0.17

0.60

-0.30

-0.02

-0.24

-0.05

0.12

0.86

-0.10

-0.03

-0.18

-0.21

0.35

0.73

-0.13
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Table 4-5. Inter-Construct Correlations
Mean

Std.

Absorptive
Capacity

4.76

1.44

0.841

IT Integration

2.64

1.58

0.199

0.901

Supplier’s
Market
Dynamism

3.42

1.42

-0.215

-0.091

0.899

Goodwill Trust

5.2

1.44

0.256

0.239

-0.204

0.898

Visibility

5.12

1.08

0.529

0.299

-0.190

0.564

0.818

Perceived
Supplier Risk

3.01

1.11

-0.499

-0.168

0.427

-0.402

-0.521

0.840

Relationship
Duration

9.63

8.28

0.231

0.107

-0.210

0.163

0.206

-0.417

1.000

Supplier’s
Substitutability

4.34

1.61

0.187

0.140

-0.203

-0.050

0.114

-0.123

0.148

Supplier’s
Absorptive
IT
Capacity Integration Market
Dynamism

Goodwill
Trust

* Number in diagonal is square root of average variance extracted (AVE)

Visibility

Perceived
Supplier
Risk

Relationship
Duration

Supplier’s
Substitutability

1.000
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Table 4-6. Measurement Items – Reliability and Validity
Construct Items

Loading

Cronbach’s Composite
Alpha
Reliability
(α)
(CR)

Average
Variance
Explained
(AVE)

Theoretical Explanatory Variables
Absorptive Capacity: With regards to the key supplier, how would you agree with the
following statements? (Likert Scale 1-7)
- We commit resources to acquire new knowledge from our key supplier.

0.858

- We commit resources to understand our key supplier's processes.

0.894

- We invest in training our employees to make better use of knowledge of our key supplier.

0.766

IT Integration: With regards to the key supplier, how would you agree with the following
statements? (Likert Scale 1-7)
- My firm’s IT system is compatible with our key supplier’s IT system.
- My firm’s IT system is aligned with our key supplier’s.
- My firm and our key supplier have invested in our IT systems to make them interoperable.
- Both my firm and our key supplier work together to integrate our IT systems.

0.897
0.939
0.900
0.902

- IT advances for supply chain communication system are well aligned between my firm and
our key supplier in order to achieve the best supply chain performance.

0.868

Visibility: Please answer the following questions with regard to the key supplier and the key
item. (Likert Scale 1-7)
- We believe that our operational information about our key supplier is accurate.

0.711

- Overall, information regarding our key supplier’s operations is available to us in a timely
manner.

0.857

- The operational information we have about our key supplier is useful to improve our
performance.

0.716

- We have a good understanding of the resource and capabilities of our key supplier.

0.841

0.796

0.879

0.708

0.943

0.956

0.813

0.899

0.923

0.669
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Construct Items (continued from previous page)

Loading

Cronbach’s
Alpha
(α)

Composite
Reliability
(CR)

Average
Variance
Explained
(AVE)

0.776

0.858

0.605

0.790

0.878

0.706

0.881

0.926

0.807

N/A*

N/A

N/A

1

N/A*

N/A

N/A

1

- We believe that the strategic information we have about our key supplier is accurate.

0.863

- The strategic information we have about our key supplier is relevant to our business.

0.899

Perceived Supplier Risk: With regard to the key supplier and the key item, to what extent
would you agree with the following statement? (Likert Scale 1-7)
- Our key supplier is not capable of providing the key item with consistent quality.
- Our key supplier has the technological capability to ensure stability in the supply of the key
item (reverse).
- Our key supplier does not have strong controls for unexpected events.
Control Variables
Market Dynamism: How would you describe the business environment in the key supplier’s
territory with regard to the key item? (7-point Semantic Scale)
Stable – Volatile
Certain – Uncertain
Predictable – Unpredictable
Goodwill Trust: Your perception of the key supplier? (Likert Scale 1-7)
If our firm required assistance, our key supplier would do its best to provide it.
Our key supplier is interested in our firm’s well-being, not just its own.
In times of difficulty (e.g. shortages), our key supplier has “gone out on a limb” for us.
Relationship Duration: How long has your firm been buying from this key supplier? (in
years)
Supplier’s Substitutability: How substitutable is the key supplier of the key item to your
firm?
N = 64
* Single item

0.854
0.880
0.783

0.942
0.941
0.809
0.883
0.905
0.907
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In particular, ex ante methods to guard against common method bias include using different
types of measures across constructs and different scale types for key construct measures;
improving wordings of items to ensure their clear meanings and protect respondent anonymity;
and making distinction between independent and dependent variables by measuring them in
different sections (Podsakoff et al 2003). In fact, in addition to Likert scales, semantic scale was
used for Supplier’s Market Dynamism. Moreover, for control variables, we use ratio scale to
measure relationship duration. Some of the data for buying firm’s size were triangulated with
data from their websites. All the above methods were used to prevent potential common method
bias to the study before the surveys were launched.
Ex post, a partial correlation procedure was employed by including a marker variable (Lindell &
Whitney 2001). A marker variable is theoretically unrelated to one or more of the other variables
in the study (Griffith & Lusch 2007; Lindell & Whitney 2001). In this study, buying firm’s
market dynamism is included as the marker variable. Theoretically, this construct should have
nothing to do with the constructs related to the firm’s supplier. Thus we should expect no
significant correlations between this construct and other variables in the main model.
Table 4-7. Common Method Bias Test
Main Model
Variables
Buying Firm’s
Pearson
Market Dynamism Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Absorptive
Capacity

IT
Integration

Perceived
Supplier Risk

Visibility

-0.078

-0.158

0.175

-0.056

0.540
64

0.213
64

0.167
64

0.663
64

As expected, I found no significant correlation even at the conservative 0.1 level between buying
firm’s market dynamism and any of the variables in our main model (see Table 4-7). This result
further provides evidence that common method bias is not likely a problem in this study.

72

4.4. Structural Model Analysis
After testing and purifying the measurement items, I employ structural equation modeling
(SEM), which allows for modeling multiple interdependent relationships, to test the model (J. C.
Anderson & Gerbing 1988). Instead of using the covariance-based SEM, however, I use partial
least squares (PLS), a component-based SEM, because this research is in a more exploratory
phase as theories in the field are still primitive. Thus, a data set that is not the result of long-term
measurement development processes and includes a mix of both primary and secondary data like
one in this study may perform acceptably in PLS, while it may produce unacceptable results in
the covariance-based SEM (David Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub 2011). Moreover, PLS has no
distributional assumptions and does not require proportionality constraints on the observed
variables (David Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub 2011). Additionally, the component-based SEM
maximizes the explained variance of the endogenous variables (Chin 1998; D. Gefen, Straub, &
Boudreau 2000), which allows us to understand how much variance is explained for the
dependent constructs of Visibility and Perceived Supplier Risk.
As part of the PLS procedure, the bootstrapping technique is used to generate t-value estimates.
The bootstrapping represents a nonparametric approach for estimating the precision of PLS path
estimate (Chin 1998). Under this approach, M samples are created by sampling with replacement
from the original dataset of N (i.e. 64 in this study). Paths then are estimated for each sample. A
distribution of the estimates from M samples is created for the path’s t-value calculation.
To test the model with PLS, I use SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Will 2005). In this study, M
bootstrapping of 200, 500, and 1,000 have been used. The results are similar. The follow results
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are reported for M of 500. All the tests for the main model, mediation, and moderation can be
done with the SmartPLS 2.0.
4.4.1. Main Model Test
Results for the main model could be found in Table 4-8. All the hypotheses for the main model
are supported. In particular, hypothesis 1 posited that visibility would reduce the perceived
supplier risk. I found that the path from visibility to perceived supplier risk is negative (-.358)
and significant at 0.01 level (t-value = 2.702). Thus hypothesis 1 is strongly supported.
Hypothesis 2 posited that absorptive capacity will enhance visibility. I found that the path from
absorptive capacity to visibility is positive (.475) and significant at 0.01 level (t-value = 4.601).
Thus hypothesis 2 is strongly supported.
Hypothesis 3 posited that IT integration will enhance visibility. I found that the path from IT
integration to visibility is positive (.198) but only significant at 0.05 level (t-value = 2.298). Thus
hypothesis 3 is supported.
As noted, I include several other variables in the model to control for spurious effects. In
particular, for visibility as the dependent variable, I found that supplier’s market dynamism is
negatively associated with visibility (-.070) but the relationship is not significant (t-value =.553).
For the perceived supplier risk as the dependent variable, I found that supplier’s market
dynamism and relationship duration are associated with perceived supplier risk with the path
estimates of .285 and -.269 as expected, respectively. The paths are significant at 0.05 and 0.01
levels, respectively (t-value = 2.474 and 3.377 respectively). However, the path from goodwill
trust to perceived supplier risk, even though negative as one might expect (-.097), is not
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significant (t-value = .827). Supplier’s substitutability is also not significantly related to
perceived supplier risk either (0.011; t-value = .109).
Table 4-8. PLS Results for Control Variable Only, Theoretical Only, and Full Models
Control Variable
Only Model
Independent
Variables

Visibility

Theoretical Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Visibility
t-value
Control Variables
Supplier’s Market
Dynamism
t-value
Relationship Duration
t-value
Supplier’s
Substitutability
t-value
Goodwill Trust
t-value
R-square

Theoretical Variable
Only Model

Full Model

Perceived
Perceived
Perceived
Supplier Visibility Supplier Visibility Supplier
Risk
Risk
Risk
0.490**
5.664
0.201*
2.487

0.475**
4.601
0.198*
2.298
-0.552**
5.453

-0.358**
2.702

-0.242

0.296**

-0.070

0.285*

1.316

2.568
-0.300**
3.258

0.553

2.474
-0.269**
3.377

6%

-0.033

0.011

0.300
-0.297**
2.745
38%

0.109
-0.097
0.827
46%

32%

27%

32%

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500

In terms of R2, 32 percent of variance in visibility has been explained by absorptive capacity, IT
integration, and supplier’s market dynamism and the model explained 46 percent of variance for
perceived supplier risk. Such relatively high R2s are in the moderate to substantial ranges for
social science studies (Chin 1998; J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen G; Aiken,
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Leona S; 2003), providing evidence for the model good fit. Moreover, compared to the controlvariable-only and theoretical-variable-only models, the full model provided higher explained
variance for the dependent variable (38%, 27%, and 46%, respectively), providing further
evidence for a good fit of the full model (see Table 4-8).
4.4.2. Mediation Test
To provide support for the hypothesized mediation effects, I employ the logic of mediation
testing proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). In particular, three conditions are required for
mediation: (1) the independent variable is significantly related to the mediator variable; (2) the
mediator variable is significantly related to the dependent variable; and (3) the relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable is reduced when both the
independent variable and mediator are considered. In our model, the independent variables are
absorptive capacity and IT integration. The mediator is visibility. And the dependent variable is
perceived supplier risk. It should be noted that I keep all the control variables in our mediation
tests. The test results are provided in Table 4-9.
In particular, the test results seemed to meet and satisfy these three conditions as we compared a
direct effect model where only absorptive capacity is linked to perceived supplier risk with the
model where the mediator visibility is also included. The relationships between absorptive
capacity and perceived supplier risk turned from significant (-.338; t-value = 3.495) into nonsignificant (-.224; t-value = 1.764) when the mediator is considered, thereby satisfying Baron
and Kenny’s condition three. Absorptive capacity is significantly linked to visibility (i.e.
condition one) and visibility is significantly associated with perceived supplier risk (i.e.
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condition two) (see Table 4-9). Visibility then could be considered the full mediator between
absorptive capacity and perceived supplier risk. Hypothesis H4a thus supported.
Table 4-9. Mediation Test Results

Independent Variables
Main Model Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Visibility
t-value
Control Variables
Supplier’s Market
Dynamism
t-value
Relationship Duration
t-value
Supplier’s
Substitutability
t-value
Goodwill Trust
t-value

Perceived Supplier Risk as Dependent Variable
Without-Mediator
With-Mediator
Full-Mediation
Model
Model
Model
-0.338**
3.495
-0.008
0.087

-0.246
1.764
0.019
0.468
-0.242*
1.972

-0.358**
2.702

0.260*

0.264**

0.285*

2.444
-0.250**
2.669

2.631
-0.243**
2.84

2.474
-0.269**
3.377

0.020

0.034

0.011

0.215
-0.218
1.894

0.38
-0.109
0.868

0.109
-0.097
0.827

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500

However, the relationship between IT integration and perceived supplier risk is not significant
whether we include visibility or not (-0.008; t-value = .087 and .019; t-value = .468,
respectively). Thus IT integration may have no effect on perceived supplier risk directly or
indirectly. Instead, IT integration only influences visibility (see Table 4-9). Hypothesis H4b
therefore is not supported.
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To further validate our data analysis here for mediation effects, I employed Sobel’s tests on the
indirect effects (Shrout & Bolger 2002; Sobel 1982). In particular, the standard errors of indirect
effects will be calculated based on the following formula:
sab =       
where sab is standard error of an indirect effect, a and b are direct effects of independent variable
on the mediator and of the mediator on dependent variable, respectively, with their respective
standard errors of sa and sb. The 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects then can be
calculated based on the formula: confidence bounds = ab

sab z.975. A confidence interval that

does not cover zero provides supports for the significance of the indirect effect (i.e. meditational
effect) (Shrout & Bolger 2002).
Test results provided on table 4-10 further supported our mediation effect analyses. In particular,
the indirect effect of absorptive capacity on perceived supplier risk via visibility is significantly
different from zero, supporting for H4a. The indirect effect of IT integration on perceived
supplier risk via visibility, however, is not significantly from zero. H4b, thus, is not supported.
Table 4-10. Sobel's Tests on Indirect Effects

Absorptive Capacity -> Visibility (a)
Visibility -> Perceived Supplier Risk (b)
Absorptive Capacity's Indirect Effect (a*b)
IT Integration -> Visibility (c)
Visibility -> Perceived Supplier Risk (d)
IT integration's Indirect Effect (c*d)
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500

Path
Estimate
0.475
-0.358
-0.170
0.198
-0.358
-0.071

Standard
Error
0.105
0.124
0.070
0.083
0.124
0.039

95% confidence interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
0.270
0.680
-0.601
-0.114
-0.307
-0.033
0.036
0.360
-0.601
-0.114
-0.146
0.005
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4.4.3. Moderation Test
To do the moderation tests, items were standardized to remove nonessential collinearity between
the interaction terms and the independent variables (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West,
Stephen G; Aiken, Leona S; 2003) and to ensure the interaction constructs have items of the
same scale unit. The standardized items then are multiplied to create items for the moderation
constructs. Results for the moderation tests are provided on Table 4-11, 4-12, and 4-13. The
results provide supports for Hypothesis 5 but not for Hypothesis 6.
Table 4-11. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator for Absorptive
Capacity on Visibility
Independent Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
t-value

Paths to Visibility
Model 1
Model 2

0.475**
4.601
0.198*
2.298
-0.070
0.553

Absorptive Capacity X Supplier's Market
Dynamism
t-value
R-square
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500

0.426**
4.269
0.203*
2.554
-0.166
1.552
-0.319*

32%

2.487
42%

In particular, hypothesis 5 posited that supplier’s market dynamism will moderate the
relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility such that the higher the market
dynamism, the weaker the positive relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility. Thus
we should expect the path estimate for the interaction term is significant and with the opposite
sign to the path estimate for the independent variable. I tested this by adding the interaction term
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between absorptive capacity and supplier’s market dynamism (see Table 4-11). I found that
before adding the interaction term, the effect of absorptive capacity is positive and significant
(Model 1). After adding the interaction term, the effect of absorptive capacity is still positive and
significant (Model 2). As expected, the interaction term effect on visibility is negative and
significant at 0.05 level (Model 2) (-.319; t-value = 2.487). R2 for visibility increases from 32
percent to 42 percent after adding the interaction term, about 10 percent more variance
explained. Thus, hypothesis 5 is supported.
To further aid in interpretation of moderation, simple equations for the interaction effects are
plotted for three values of the moderator: the mean, one standard deviation below the mean, and
one standard deviation above the mean. If the lines are parallel, there are no interactions since the
value of dependent variable corresponds to the value of the independent variable at a constant
rate (i.e. equal slopes) across all values of the moderator. In contrast, if the lines are not parallel,
there is an interaction (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen G; Aiken, Leona S;
2003). The simple plots for the moderation effects of supplier’s market dynamism on the
relationship between absorptive capacity and visibility are showed in Figure 4-1.
The plots seemed to show that there is moderation effect of supplier’s market dynamism because
the slope turns from very steep to less steep and almost parallel to the horizontal axis when
supplier’s market dynamism takes the values from low to high. The slopes at the mean and one
standard deviation below the mean values of supplier market’s dynamism look steep and not
parallel to the horizontal axis. Thus, this provides further supports for hypothesis 5.
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High

Low

High

Z is the standardized
score of supplier’s
market dynamism.

Figure 4-2. Simple Slopes for Visibility on Absorptive Capacity at Different Values of
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
To test for our suspicion that supplier’s market dynamism, while moderating the relationship
between absorptive capacity and visibility, will not affect the one between IT integration and
visibility, a similar model where the interaction term between IT integration and supplier’s
market dynamism is added (see Table 4-12). As expected, the path from the interaction term of
IT integration and supplier’s market dynamism to visibility, even though also negative (-.214), is
not significant (t-value = 1.469). It provides support for our argument that supplier’s market
dynamism may not moderate the relationship between IT integration and visibility.
Simple equations plotted for this moderation equations can be found in Figure 4-2. The lines do
not seem to parallel but the slopes look pretty flat and are not clearly different from each other.
Thus there may be no moderation effect here or the effect is not significant (Table 4-12).
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Table 4-12. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator for IT
Integration on Visibility
Independent Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
t-value
IT Integration X Supplier's Market
Dynamism
t-value
R-square
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500

Paths to Visibility
Model 1
Model 2
0.475**
0.483**
4.601
4.562
0.198*
0.166
2.298
1.715
-0.070
-0.096
0.553
0.781
-0.214
32%

1.469
37%

High

Low

High

Z is the standardized
score of supplier’s
market dynamism.

Figure 4-2. Simple Slopes for Visibility on IT Integration at Different Values of Supplier’s
Market Dynamism
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Hypothesis 6 posited that goodwill trust will moderate the relationship between visibility and
perceived supplier risk such that the higher the goodwill trust, the weaker the negative
relationship between visibility and perceived supplier risk. Thus we should expect the interaction
term’s path is significant and with the opposite sign to the path from visibility to perceived
supplier risk. The test result is provided in Table 4-13.
Table 4-13. Goodwill Trust as Moderator for Visibility on Perceived
Supplier Risk

Independent Variables
Visibility
t-value
Goodwill Trust
t-value
Visibility x Goodwill Trust
t-value
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
t-value
Relationship Duration
t-value
Supplier’s Substitutability
t-value
R-square
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 64; Bootstrapping = 500

Paths to Perceived Supplier
Risk
Model 1
Model 2
-0.239
-0.358**
1.909
2.702
-0.090
-0.097
0.827
0.686
0.222
0.778
0.285*
0.365**
3.397
2.474
-0.269**
-0.259**
3.124
3.377
0.017
0.011
0.109
0.171
46%
49%

As we could see from the Table 4-13, the path from visibility to perceived supplier risk is
negative and significant before adding the interaction term (Model 1) and is still negative but
only almost significant after we added the term (Model 2). The interaction term between
visibility and goodwill trust is positively associated with perceived supplier risk as expected
(.222) but not significant (t-value = .778). R2 only increases from 46 percent to 49 percent after
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adding the interaction term (3 percent more variance explained for perceived supplier risk). Thus
hypothesis 6 is not supported.
In the same vein, simple equations are plotted for the moderation effect of goodwill trust on the
relationship between visibility and perceived supplier risk (Figure 4-3). Even though the lines
seem to cross (i.e. different slopes), the slope differences are not so clear and in fact not
significant (Table 4-13). Thus the analysis results do not support hypothesis 6.

High

High

Low

Z is the standardized
score of goodwill trust.

Figure 4-3. Simple Slopes for Perceived Supplier Risk on Visibility at Different Values of
Goodwill Trust

4.4.4. Robustness Test
As mentioned earlier, our data sample includes two firms of extraordinary big size which may
influence the analysis result. Thus I excluded the two firms when doing the analyses above. To
test if data from the two firms may change the above analysis result, the two firms are included
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back for testing and comparing results. Analysis results showed that including the two big firms
actually did not change our results significantly (see tables on the Appendix C). Results for the
main model are almost the same with all the significant paths as expected, compared to the
results for the sample without the two firms.
Compared to the analysis of the sample of 64, there is only a minor difference for the results of
testing the main model. That is the path from visibility to perceived supplier risk is still
significant, but only at the .05 level (instead of the 0.01 level as in the sample of 64 firms). Thus,
these results provide evidence that our model test results may be robust to different firm size.
In short, this chapter provides details for item generation process, survey, and model testing. A
summary of the model testing results and hypotheses can be found in Figure 4-4 and in Table 414. In general, analysis results provided supports for our model. In the next chapter, I’ll discuss
the analysis results, theoretical and practical implications for this study, limitations, and
directions for further research.
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Table 4-14. Summary of Hypothesis Testing
Hypotheses

Relationships

Supported

H1

For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will reduce
Perceived Supplier Risk.

Yes

H2

For a buying firm, Absorptive Capacity will increase
Visibility into its supplier.

Yes

H3

For a buying firm, IT Integration with its supplier will
increase Visibility into its supplier.

Yes

H4a

For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate
the relationship between its Absorptive Capacity and
Perceived Supplier Risk.

Yes

H4b

For a buying firm, Visibility into its supplier will mediate
the relationship between the firms’ IT Integration and
Perceived Supplier Risk.

No

H5

For a buying firm, the Supplier’s Market Dynamism will
negatively moderate the positive relationship between
Absorptive Capacity and Visibility such that when
Supplier’s Market Dynamism is high the relationship
between Absorptive Capacity and Visibility will be
weaker, compared to when Supplier’s Market Dynamism
is low.

Yes

H6

For a buying firm, Goodwill Trust will negatively
moderate the negative relationship between Visibility and
Perceived Supplier Risk such that when Goodwill Trust is
high the relationship between Visibility and Perceived
Supplier Risk will be weaker, compared to when
Goodwill Trust is low.

No
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MD1

.942

MD2

.941

MD3

GT1

GT2

.883

.809

.905

Supplier’s
Market
Dynamism

AC1

.894

AC2

.907

Goodwill Trust

-.319*
(2.487)

.858

GT3

.222
(.686)H

Absorptive
Capacity

.766

R2 = 32%

R2 = 46%

Visibility

Perceived
Supplier Risk

.854

SR1

AC3

.475**
(4.601)

-.358**
(2.702)

.880

SR2
.783

SR3

II1

.897

II2

.939

.198*
(2.298)
IT Integration

.900

II3
.902

II4
II5

.711

.857

.716

.841

.863

.899

.868

VI1

VI2

VI3

VI4

VI5

VI6

Figure 4-4. Model Testing ResultsFigure 3-3. Model and Hypotheses

Notes:
* significant at .05 level.
** significant at .01 level.
t-values are in brackets.
Control variables are not shown in
the figure.

CHAPTER V. DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
This dissertation started with two key observations that (1) firms in the supply chain have been
becoming more connected than ever and (2) disruptions have occurred more and more frequently
in the global supply chains. As a result, firms in the supply chain may suffer from the potential
ripple effects of disruptions. For a manufacturing firm, the disruption risks from its suppliers,
especially the international ones, thus become prominent and need urgent attention. Dealing with
the risks reactively (i.e. after they have occurred) is usually costly and sometimes ineffective.
Thus, in this dissertation, I developed a model that links the key capability factors to help
mitigate perceived supplier risk. The model delineated the configuration of information-based
capabilities in mitigating supplier risk with the emphasis on visibility. Using data from U.S.
manufacturing firms who partner with international suppliers, all the hypotheses in the model
have been tested with adequate degree of rigor. In the following sections, hypothesis testing
results for the model will be discussed. Next, I discuss the theoretical and practical implications
from the paper results. Finally, limitations of the paper will be discussed with the respective
recommendations for future research.
5.1. Model Result Discussions
In this section, I will discuss the results of the hypothesis testing, what arguments they supported,
and how they are different or similar to previous results in extant literature. Hypotheses for the
main model will be discussed first. Moderation hypotheses will be discussed next with some
explanations offered for the non-significant finding of goodwill trust as moderator.
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Almost all the hypotheses in the main model are supported. In particular, hypothesis 1 which
posited that visibility will help reduce perceived supplier risk is strongly supported. This
provides evidence for the arguments that visibility into its supplier (1) will help enhance the
forecasting ability of the buying firm for possible disruptions from the supplier and thus (2) may
enhance the control ability or at least the sense of control for the buying firm over its
international supplier. The uncertainty component of perceived risk therefore will be reduced.
This result is consistent with the fragmented evidence from previous articles. For example, it is
consistent with the findings by Lee et al (1997; 2004) that internal data shared from its partner
could help a firm in a supply chain better able to forecast inventory levels and thus lower the
bullwhip effect risk in supply chains.
It is important to note that hypothesis 1 is supported even after other variables have been
controlled for. In particular, four other variables have been included as the covariates including
supplier’s market dynamism, supplier substitutability, goodwill trust, and relationship duration.
Thus, compared to a previous model (i.e. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010), my model provides
much higher explained variance for the construct of perceived supplier risk. While the model in
Ellis et al. (2010) explained nearly 12 percent for the variance of supplier risk, the one in this
study explained almost 46 percent. This is because the model in this dissertation extended the
previous model in Ellis et al. (2010) by adding some key important variables including visibility,
supplier’s market dynamism, and long-term relationship (cf. Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010). In
fact, the 46 percent explained variance falls within the range from moderate to substantial for
social science research (Chin 1998). That provides further evidence that visibility is an important
concept that needs including, together with several other variables, when examining perceived
supplier risk.
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Several control variables for perceived supplier risk should be noted. First, in the model, I found
that supplier’s market dynamism and relationship duration are significantly associated with
perceived supplier risk. While the former is consistent with the finding by Ellis et al. (2010), the
latter has not been considered in previous research. These findings, even though are not in my
main thesis, are interesting. This is because supplier’s market dynamism is still positively
associated with perceived supplier risk even in the presence of other variables including visibility
and relationship duration. This may be explained by the fact that even though visibility could
provide the sense of control and forecast ability for the buying firm, there are still uncertainty
elements which come from the external environment (i.e. the supplier’s market) that the buying
firm may not be able to forecast and control for. Such elements may be the black swans which
are disproportionately high-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare events that blind-sight the
managers. (Seville et al 2008; Taleb 2007).
Similarly, relationship duration was found to have a significant negative relationship with
perceived supplier risk even in the presence of visibility and supplier’s market dynamism. It is
possible that the mere fact of working with the supplier for a long period of time is an evidence
for lower possibility of disruptions from the supplier. The suppliers with disruptive history may
have been cut off or changed by the buying firm as the relationship matures. All in all, further
research is worthwhile for the relationships between visibility and other control variables with
perceived supplier risk.
Second and interestingly, I did not find a significant relationship between supplier
substitutability and perceived supplier risk. This is in contrast with the finding by Ellis et al.
(2010) that the degree to which a buying firm has a limited number of alternative sources of
supply to meet a need has a positive relationship with the probability of supplier disruption. In
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fact, Ellis et al. (2010) offered two possible mechanisms for the positive relationship: (1) lock-in
and (2) reduced information flow. They argued that because a buyer has fewer alternatives, the
relationship with its supplier will be subjected to opportunism and the information flows will be
limited. These lines of argument, however, may not hold if we consider one particular
relationship. In particular, in a cooperative relationship where a buyer could gain high visibility
into its supplier, for example, the fact that it has fewer alternatives may not have a simple linear
relationship with the opportunism nor may it reduce information flow. In contrast, as the number
of suppliers a buyer has increases to a very high level, the supply base may become too complex
to deal with, increasing the supply risk (Choi & Krause 2006). Thus this relationship may not be
linear or simple as we thought and may require further research.
Next, hypotheses 2 and 3 link the potential information-based capabilities to visibility. I found
supports for both hypotheses. In particular, hypothesis 2 based on the argument that because a
buying firm with higher potential absorptive capacity is more able than others to value and
assimilate external knowledge (cf. W. M. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; Lane & Lubatkin 1998).
This is because absorptive capacity depends on investments in individual absorptive capacity.
Trained and adequately equipped employees in the buying firm then can learn easily to overcome
the barriers to knowledge transfer and therefore absorb the knowledge and information from its
supplier faster and easier. Thus firms with higher absorptive capacity may have higher visibility
into its supplier. The supported result for this hypothesis is consistent with previous studies. For
example, Lyles and Salk found that capacity to learn and investment in training are positively
related to knowledge acquisition by a firm from its partner (Lyles & Salk 2007). Similarly, in
international joint-venture context, Phan et al. (2006) found that investment in training
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employees will facilitate knowledge acquisition by the employees from their joint-venture
partner.
In the same vein, I found supports for hypothesis 3, which posited the positive relationship
between IT integration and visibility. This hypothesis was founded on the argument that IT
integration and alignment between partners’ systems provide the firms with common supporting
operations to exchange information. Thus IT integration will smooth out the flow of active
information within and across firms (Wu et al 2006), facilitating a buying firm to gain
information of good quality from its partnering supplier. The empirical finding for this
hypothesis is consistent with the findings in previous articles where researchers found IT
integration lead to better quality of information exchanged (Kim, Cavusgil, & Calantone 2006)
or IT alignment facilitates supply chain to increase the amount of information exchange (Wu et
al 2006).
One of the main theses in this study is that visibility is a key capability via which other
capabilities will operate to mitigate perceived supplier risk. Thus hypotheses 4a and b posited
that visibility will mediate the relationships between potential capabilities such as absorptive
capacity and IT integration with perceived supplier risk. Our data analysis provided supports for
hypothesis 4a but not 4b. This finding is interesting because while important, the capabilities
such as absorptive capacity and IT integration will not operate well without visibility to gain the
needed income. On the one hand, absorptive capacity may influence the risk outcome but only
via visibility. IT integration, on the other hand, may have no effects on the risk outcome directly
or indirectly. IT integration only has its influence on visibility. Thus absorptive capacity and IT
integration will only provide the necessary, not sufficient, conditions for mitigating supplier risk.
Making the distinction and the configuration of the capabilities are also important as it helps
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explain why some buying firms may perceive very high risk from its suppliers even though they
have similar absorptive capability and degree of IT integration. This line of argument parallels
the distinction between potential and realized absorptive capacity (Zahra & George 2002) or the
roles of IT alignment versus supply chain capability (Wu et al 2006), which have not been tested
empirically. This study could be the first to test such line of argument. In short, the above
hypotheses provided supports for our main model with the central thesis that some key
information-based capabilities in their bundles can support and leverage each other to mitigate
supplier risk proactively.
The last two hypotheses, which explored the contextual conditions for the main model, found
mixed support. In particular, hypothesis 5 posited that the influence of absorptive capacity on
visibility will be weakened when the supplier’s market is highly dynamic. This is because a
dynamic environment surrounding the supplier will make it difficult to make sense of the
environment. The supplier therefore may not be able to transfer the needed information to the
buyer even it is willing to do so. Moreover, the buyer will find it training knowledge for
employees become obsolete very fast. As a result, under such dynamic environment, firms with
even high absorptive capacity may not be able to turn it into high degree of visibility into its
supplier. Data analysis results provided support for this hypothesis.
Interestingly, supplier’s market dynamism was found not to moderate the relationship between
IT integration and visibility. An explanation could be offered for this finding. This is because
when two firms have established their system integration, the information transferred via the
system is standardized and institutionalized. The market conditions thus may have been taken
into account or they may not disrupt the information transfer process. This finding, however,
may not necessarily mean that the effect of IT integration on visibility is more important because
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it is less context-dependent, compared to absorptive capacity. In fact, a post-hoc analysis in the
sample of 64 firms found that the effect size of absorptive capacity on visibility is about 30
percent while the effect size of IT integration is only about five percent. Moreover, only
absorptive capacity was found to have an indirect effect on perceived supplier risk. The finding
here thus may only mean that absorptive capacity is more difficult for a buying firm to develop
as it is context-dependent but when adequately invested it can fruitfully lead to higher visibility
into it supplier for mitigating supplier risk, compared to IT integration.
In the last hypothesis, I argued for a possible substitutability of visibility and goodwill trust for
each other in mitigating perceived supplier risk. This is because goodwill trust could act as an
informal control and therefore can substitute for visibility in mitigating risk. Our data analysis,
however, found no significant relationship between the interaction term and perceived supplier
risk even though the effect sign is positive as expected. Further examination of the arguments
and data provides some possible explanations for this.
First, the argument that goodwill trust can act as the substitute for visibility may not be valid, at
least for the sample of the firms in the United States in this study. The notion that trust is “not a
naïve faith where people take for granted the reliability…of their counterpart based on decision
made in the distant past” (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003, p. 99) makes trust fragile and not
enough to substitute for visibility. In another word, firms still need to periodically process
information and clues about their counterparts to assess a situation. “Trust requires intermittent
information processing because it is an intrinsically social organizing principle” (McEvily,
Perrone, & Zaheer 2003, p. 99). Due to the limitations of sample size and dimensions of trust
measured, however, further discussions or interpretation for this finding may be misleading.
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Second, non-significant findings of the moderation effect should always be checked if they can
be attributed to the problems in the measurement and data sampling. In this study, however, the
construct of goodwill trust seems to be measured adequately with good reliability and validity.
Caution, however, may be taken with the small sample size because it may prevent us from
finding a significant relationship for the interaction term. In fact, the interaction term is a secondorder term. Finding an effect for such high-order terms thus usually requires a larger sample size
than for low-order term. A sample size of only 64 or 66 thus may restrict the range, preventing us
from finding a significant relationship (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen G;
Aiken, Leona S; 2003). Together with other hypotheses supported, this testing result provides
implications theoretically and practically which I would discuss next.
5.2. Theoretical Implications
This dissertation makes several contributions to theories of supplier risk, resource-based view
and relational view, and the inter-firm trust literature. First, the concepts of risk in general and
perceived supplier risk in particular have been clearly explicated. In this dissertation, the concept
of supplier risk is conceptualized as a subjective and relationship-specific construct. In another
words, the supplier risk to a buyer has to be considered within their particular relationship. A
buyer may be sourcing one item from several suppliers. The buyer’s perceived supplier risks thus
may be different toward different suppliers. This is important because how a firm perceives its
particular supplier will determine the behaviors or strategies that the firm may have toward the
particular partner.
Second, this study contributes to the literature of resource-based view and the relational view
(Barney 1991; Dyer & Singh 1998). In particular, the model in this dissertation posited a
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relationship between relationship-specific capabilities and perceived supplier risk. Findings in
this study confirm the view that a buying firm’s capabilities, such as absorptive capacity, IT
integration, and visibility, when developed, can help it mitigate the supplier risk, thus improving
the relationship-specific performance for the buying firm when dealing with its supplier. A
frequently disruptive supply chain is costly for a buying firm (Hendricks & Singhal 2005a,
2005b) and thus lowers the firm’s performance. In fact, a post-hoc analysis in this study
confirmed the assumption that perceived supplier risk can be considered a reverse of
relationship-specific performance. The correlation between perceived supplier risk and a scale of
relationship-specific performance (R. Klein & Rai 2009) is negatively high and significant (r = .534, significant at 0.01 level).
Third, and more importantly, this study adds to the capability discussion of the resource-based
and relational views (Barney 1991; Dyer & Singh 1998; Wernerfelt 1984). For example, a
nuance to those views is the way that capabilities may facilitate each other in mitigating risk. The
general views on resource and capabilities usually state that the resources and/or capabilities,
when developed and when they meet several conditions, could lead to high performance or
competitive advantage for a firm. Few attempts have been made to clarify the configurations and
mechanisms under which capabilities could result in higher performance. In this paper, I made a
distinction between absorptive capacity and IT integration with visibility with the emphasis on
the latter in risk mitigation. This is important because absorptive capacity and IT integration can
only operate via visibility to result in higher performance outcome with regards to supplier risk.
Findings from this study confirmed this argument.
In another way, a nuance has been added to the views by examining the contextual conditions
under which capabilities will operate. In particular, I have argued and found that the condition
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surrounding a supplier may facilitate or hamper the effect of absorptive capacity on visibility but
have no influence on the relationship between IT integration and visibility. Such contextual or
boundary conditions are important to understand when a relationship may work or may not work.
Similarly, I argued for the moderating effect of goodwill trust on the relationship between
visibility and perceived supplier risk even though I did not find support for this argument with
the data sample in this study.
In fact, the non-significant findings for the moderation effect of goodwill trust could be a
contribution to the literature of trust, at least for its dimension of benevolence or goodwill. This
is because findings in this study seem to demonstrate that trust, and more particular the goodwill
trust, may be fragile and should not considered a naïve faith (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer 2003).
While important, trust alone is not enough and may need to be complemented by other important
organizing principles such as visibility. The fact that visibility has significant (negative)
relationship with supplier risk even when other variables have been controlled, while goodwill
trust does not, seems to direct to the critical role of visibility in a buyer-supplier relationship,
rather than trust. Again, further extrapolation can be misleading and dangerous given the
limitations of sample size and the dimensions of trust examined in this study, issues that I will
discuss in the limitation and future research section.
5.3. Practical Implications
Given the recent disruptions in multiple supply chains and the global economic crisis, a study on
factors that could help mitigate supplier risks proactively is in urgent need. This study provides
several implications which can be classified into two categories: implications for buyers and for
suppliers.
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For buying firms who are dealing with international suppliers, this study suggested that a key
capability that needs to be developed to mitigate supplier risks proactively is visibility. A buying
firm thus may want to ensure it gets the information from its supplier accurately, relevantly, and
in a timely manner. The information here should include not only the operation activities but the
strategies and technological knowledge. Lacking visibility into its supplier is similar to
conducting business blindly with the supplier. Those who lack visibility are vulnerable and when
disruptions occur they have to try to resolve the damages by costly remedies. The losses accrued
by Boeing recently with its project of Dreamliner 787 is a valuable lesson that any firms should
learn (see Greising & Johnsson 2007 among others for more details).
It is important to note that developing visibility is a capability that other mechanisms may not be
able to substitute for. First, a long relationship with a supplier alone may not be enough to ensure
lower supplier risk for a buyer. Usually a long relationship means the relationship is stable and
working with the supplier is still considered valuable for a buyer that it may not want to change
yet. However, even after controlling for relationship duration, visibility is still significantly
related to supplier risk. This result means that visibility into a supplier thus is important for the
buyer regardless the fact that it has a short or long relationship with the supplier.
Second, despite the market conditions surrounding the supplier, visibility is still the key to ensure
a lower supplier risk. Results from this study seem to show that there may be still elements in the
macro environment that managers in a buying firm may not be able to control for or at least they
feel that they cannot control for. Huge disruptions that rarely happen such as the earthquake in
Japan in 2011 may be uncontrollable, nor predictable. Still many other disruptions and/or their
consequences can be mitigated proactively or at least, the impacts of the rare events may be
lessened if a buying firm could gain adequate visibility into its supplier.
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Third, developing trust through supplier’s goodwill may not help nor substitute for visibility in
mitigating supplier risk. In many instances, a supplier is benevolent and does not have any intent
to cheat or take advantage of the buyer. However, many other factors may involve and operate
that possibly cause disruptions for the supplier and then ripple through to the buyer. Gaining
visibility thus is not about if a firm wanted to trust its supplier or not. It is about mitigating the
potential disruption risk from the supplier.
The last factor that has been controlled for in the model is supplier’s substitutability. Data
analysis, however, showed that this factor is not significantly related to supplier risk. The
implication for a buyer then is that we may no longer be able to depend on the old-fashioned
approach that the U.S. manufacturing usually follows: using multiple sources for a needed item.
This is because using multiple sources may not reduce the disruption risk from a particular
supplier as specified in this study result. Increasing the number of suppliers may even hamper
visibility into each supplier because the supply base becomes more complex to manage.
Moreover, given the accelerating failure rate of suppliers due to the recent economic slowdown
(McKinsey & Company Operations Extranet 2010), it cannot be guaranteed that a buyer can turn
to other suppliers when one supplier fails to supply the needed item. Note that, however, this
observation does not recommend buyers to use a single-source approach. In some cases, some
alternative sources for a needed item may be necessary. The key here is to gain visibility into the
suppliers that a buyer is sourcing from to prevent possible disruptions and mitigate their
subsequent losses.
Moreover, the model in this study also provides some pathways for buying firms to develop
visibility into its suppliers. Visibility can be developed through investing in developing
absorptive capacity and IT integration. Thus to gain visibility, a buying firm may invest in
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training its boundary employees to be able to value and assimilate the external knowledge related
to the supplier and the item sourced. Aligning and integrating the information systems with the
supplier are also recommended because such alignment can facilitate information exchange
between the firms. Note that, however, the model results seem to show that developing
absorptive capacity for employees is more important than the IT systems themselves. It should
be remembered that whatever systems can be, they are designed by people and the information
exchanged via the systems must be and can only be for the institutionalized and standardized
ones. Investing in training employees for higher absorptive capacity, however, may be costly and
a continuing job because in a changing environment, knowledge can be obsolete very soon.
Also for the above reason, it is not recommended that a buyer should develop visibility into just
any suppliers. Developing such capability is costly and time-dependent. A buyer thus should
consider the cost-benefit balance for gaining visibility. When a sourced item is strategically
important, gaining visibility to lower supplier risk may be worthwhile.
From practical point of view, managers in a buyer may use the measurement scales developed in
this study to measure the degree of visibility and perceived supplier risk by surveying their
boundary employees. These measurement scales have been proved to have reliability and
validity and thus could be used to monitor the current status of risk and visibility when a buying
firm is dealing with its supplier. Because disruptions could occur any time and a reliable supplier
today may not guarantee disruptions will not happen in the future, measuring the degrees of
visibility and risk should be done on a regular basis, especially for the strategically important
items.
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Even though the model in this study takes a buyer’s perspective, it has implications for suppliers.
Thus some recommendations can also be made for suppliers who are doing business with
international buyer. For example, as visibility is very important for a buyer to reduce the supplier
risk, it is important for a supplier to help a buyer gain its visibility too. This is because a buyer
that perceives high risk from its supplier may consider change its supplier and go for an
alternative (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley 2010). Moreover, helping a buyer to gain transparency into
the supplier’s operation and capabilities can help the buyer foster capability and performance
improvement for the supplier (Joshi 2009).
But should a supplier disclose full information, even the most sensitive, to any buyers? The
simple answer is no even though the model in this study cannot help answer the question directly
because it was only examined from a buyer’s perspective. Lessons from fostering bilateral
strategic relationships, however, seem to show that if a supplier considers a buyer as a strategic
partner, it may be worthwhile to disclose sensitive information. Of course, disclosing such
sensitive information can be a matter of relationship evaluation in terms of not only the powerdependence structure but also the trust sentiment over a partner (Frazier 2009). Moreover, in
exchange, the supplier may require the same degree of information sharing from its buyer
because transparency may be and should be a balanced and bilateral issue that no side could do
to force the other to disclose information unilaterally (Lamming et al 2005).
Besides other mechanisms, the least a supplier can do to help its buyer gaining visibility, as the
model in this paper suggests, is to align and integrate its IT system with the buyer’s. Such
alignment will help facilitate information sharing in an efficient and speedy manner. The supplier
may also facilitate its buyer to absorb new knowledge related to the item it is providing.
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5.4. Limitation and Future Research
Though most of the hypotheses are supported and the study provides a useful perspective in
mitigating supplier risk, this study has several shortcomings that should be addressed in future
research. The limitations for this study will be discussed in terms of both the methodological
design and theoretical framework.
Methodologically, this study involves the collection of perceptual data from a single source at a
particular point in time. Thus it may entail several methodological limitations. For example, the
use of single data source for both dependent and independent variables may create a common
method bias. This limitation has been somewhat addressed in this study by using key informant
method. The informants here are at a high level of management and work with the supplier for a
certain period of time. Thus they could have good knowledge about the relationship with the
variables and can answer the questionnaire adequately. Moreover, methods have been carried out
to reduce the potential for common method bias by separating the dependent and independent
variables and by adding a marker variable for testing such bias. Still, to address these concerns
further, additional research should consider using other source of data such as archival measures
and in-depth examination of the firms studied. Dyadic data and/or multiple informants within an
organization can also be considered to provide a triangulated view on the variables examined.
Another methodological limitation is the use of cross-sectional data to test cause-and-effect
relationships. This violates a key condition for establishing cause and effect, namely the cause
must exist before the effect. However, this is a common practice in our field because surveying
managers become more challenging and costly. Moreover, the model in this study has been
subjected to theoretical lens to provide the logics for cause-and-effect relationships. Still,
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additional studies should consider using experimental and quasi-experimental methods or
longitudinal data to facilitate temporal separation between cause and effect variables.
Small sample size is another limitation of this study. Although most of the hypotheses were
supported and the measurement items seem to be reliable and valid, small sample size may lower
the power to detect high-order relationship (J. C. Cohen, Jacob; Cohen, Patricia; West, Stephen
G; Aiken, Leona S; 2003). In fact, this study employed PLS with bootstrapping method to
calculate t-values more accurately for the path estimates. To some extent, the method can
mitigate the limitation of small sample size when relationships are tested. Still, replication
research with larger sample size may be needed to further confirm results in this study.
In addition to the methodological limitations, future studies should attempt to deepen the extant
knowledge about supplier risk in several theoretical aspects. First, in this study only the
disruption risk is examined. Even though it is the focus of this study and motivated by some
observations about the recent phenomenon, it represents only one type of supplier risk. Other
types of risks from suppliers such as relational risk, IT system risk, and social corporate risk
(Spekman & Davis 2004) could be examined in their relationships or interaction with the
disruption risk in the future studies.
Second, this study identified and tested the model for some key information-based capabilities
including visibility, absorptive capacity, and IT integration. Examining these information-based
capabilities is appropriate given the nature of supplier risk is uncertainty which is informationrelated. Other control variables have also been used and the model provided a substantial 46
percent of explained variance for the variable of supplier risk. Still other variables may be
considered to increase further the explained variance in additional studies.
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Third, in this study only goodwill trust is examined as a moderator on the relationship between
visibility and supplier risk. Although the focus on goodwill trust is appropriate in light of the
attempt to identify an informal substitute for visibility in mitigating supplier risk, other
components of trust may be considered in future research including ability and honesty. Future
research should examine how different components of trust may influence or moderate the
pathways to perceived supplier risk.
Fourth, while visibility has been identified and proved to be the key capability to mitigate
supplier risk, in this study, only two key information-based potential capabilities have been
examined as the antecedents to visibility. Although examining absorptive capacity and visibility
is appropriate because they represent the groups of factors that may influence visibility. Given
the fact that visibility can be a bilateral issue which involves both sides in a relationship, other
factors as antecedents to visibility may be considered in additional research. These include, for
example, other IT resources or capabilities such as IT advancement and internal IT integration
(Wu et al 2006). With data from the supplier side, other relational variables such as supplier’s
trust and commitment on buyer can also be included in future studies.
As a conclusion, this study provides a useful framework and a valuable perspective for
mitigating supplier risk. In general, data collected for this study provided support for the model
proposed. Future research, however, can capitalize on the limitations of this study to design
better studies to understand supplier risk. This is an important and interesting phenomenon. The
mere fact that disruptions from global suppliers become more and more prominent recently while
many managers still pay little attention to these, at least in our sampling frame of U.S.
manufacturers, makes it a very interesting and worthwhile topic for further research.
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May 2011
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESEARCH AND EDUCATION (CIBER)
A National Resource Center Designated by the U.S. Department of Education

104

105

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY CIBER

BENCHMARK SURVEY OF LEADING-EDGE PRACTICES IN
MITIGATING GLOBAL PROCUREMENT RISKS
Please answer all questions in this survey as they relate to your most important foreign
supplier (we refer to this as a key supplier). This should be an independent foreign firm that
is supplying a critical and frequently-purchased product to your company. We refer to this
product as the key item. This key item likely represents an important purchase in terms of
business volume and/or criticality. Please respond to all questions in the context of the
key foreign supplier and the key item.
Please briefly describe the key item (i.e., equipment, components, etc.) that this key foreign supplier sells
to your firm:
__. Moderately
Extremely
Critical

Please indicate the degree of criticality of the key item for your
manufacturing process:

Critical

1

2

3

4

5

Easily
Substitutable

How substitutable is the key supplier of the key item to your firm?

1

2

6

7

NonSubstitutable

3

4

5

6

7

A. For each of the following questions, otherwise indicated, please mark the number that best
describes your answer on the scale from 1= Strongly Disagree to 7= Strongly Agree.
I. Doing Business with this Key Supplier
Strongly
Disagree

1

In doing business with our key supplier, we rely on our familiarity of
the business culture in our key supplier’s market.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

We commit resources to acquire new knowledge from our key
supplier.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

We commit resources to understand our key supplier’s processes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

We invest in training our employees to make better use of knowledge
of our key supplier.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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II. Key Supplier’s Business Environment
How would you describe the business environment in the key supplier’s territory with regard to the
key item?
Stable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Volatile

Certain

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Uncertain

Changes slowly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Changes rapidly

Predictable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unpredictable

Stable market
conditions

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Erratic market conditions

III. Information Technology (IT) Systems:

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

My firm’s IT system is compatible with our key supplier’s IT system.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

My firm’s IT system is aligned with our key supplier’s.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

My firm and our key supplier have invested in our IT systems to make
them interoperable.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

Both my firm and our key supplier work together to integrate our IT
systems.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

IT advances for supply chain communication system are well aligned
between my firm and our key supplier in order to achieve the best
supply chain performance.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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IV. Perceptions of the Key Supplier:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

If our firm required assistance, our key supplier would do its best to
provide it.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

Our key supplier is interested in our firm’s well being, not just its own. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

In times of difficulty (e.g. shortages), our key supplier has “gone out
on a limb” for us.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

Our key supplier tends to be candid in our dealings with it.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

We would characterize our key supplier as being fair in its dealing
with us.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

Overall, our key supplier keeps its commitments.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Supplier’s operational information relates to process issues on the supplier’s side including delivery
schedules, production and operation schedules, and logistic arrangements.
Please answer the following questions with regard to the key supplier and the key item.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

We believe that our operational information about our key supplier is
accurate.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

Overall, information regarding our key supplier’s operations is
available to us in a timely manner.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

The operational information we have about our key supplier is relevant
1
to our operation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

The operational information we have about our key supplier is useful
to improve our performance.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

Our key supplier shares with us the information regarding its process
issues in a timely manner.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Supplier’s strategic information relates to resource, commitment, and relatively irreversible intentions
and actions of the supplier.
Please answer the following questions with regard to the key supplier and the key item.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

We have a good understanding of the resource and capabilities of our
key supplier.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

We believe that the strategic information we have about our key
supplier is accurate.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

The strategic information we have about our key supplier is up-to-date. 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

The strategic information we have about our key supplier is relevant to
our business.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

We have access to long-term plans of our key supplier in a timely
manner.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

The strategic information we have about our key supplier is useful for
improving our performance.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

With regard to the key supplier and the key item, to what extent would you agree with the following
statements?
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

We fear that potential disruptions from our key supplier may result
in significant losses for us.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

We fear that sourcing the item from our key supplier may expose us to
significant losses.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

We fear that disruptions in our key supplier’s business environment
may result in significant losses for us.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

We fear that our key supplier’s vulnerabilities may expose us to
significant loss.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

We fear that our key supplier may expose us to potential disruptions.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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With regard to the key supplier and the key item, to what extent would you agree with the following
statements?
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

We don’t have workable plans to cope with potential disruptions to the
key item availability.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

Our key supplier does not have strong controls for unexpected events.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

In case of disruptions, we have limited legal grounds to force our key
supplier to address our claims.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Our key supplier’s performance is resilient to volatile changes in its
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
business environment.
With regard to the key item purchased from the key supplier, to what extent would you agree with
the following statements?
4

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

There is a high possibility of untimely delivery of the key item.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

There is a high possibility of cost overruns for the key item.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

Our key supplier is not reliable in providing the key item.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

Our key supplier is financially stable.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

Our key supplier is not capable of providing the key item with
consistent quality.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

Our key supplier does not have the technological capability to ensure
stability in the supply of the key item.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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With regard to the relationship-specific performance, how would you agree with the following
statements?
Our firm has realized the following performance outcomes as a result of our interactions with this
key supplier:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

1

Improved asset management.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

Increased productivity.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

Lower operating costs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

Improved production planning.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

Improved resource control.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

Increased flexibility.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

B. Finally, with our full respect to confidentiality, we seek your opinion on the impact of the key
supplier on your firm. We are not asking for accounting data, just some rough indicators.
1. Do you have a formal, signed contract with the key supplier? ____ yes ____ no.
2. If yes, how frequently do you renew the contract? _________________.
3. Please name the country from which the key item is sourced?_________________.
4. How long has your firm been buying from this key supplier? _______________ year(s).
5. During the past year, approximately what percentage of your firm’s total procurement budget was
allocated to purchases from this key supplier?

__________ %.

6. What percentage of cost of the final product is accounted for by this key item? _________ %.
7. How would describe the market of the final product you mentioned in the above question?
Stable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Erratic

Certain

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Uncertain

Predictable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unpredictable
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8. Which industry does your firm operate in? _________________________________.
9. About how many non-administrative employees are there in your division or business unit in the
U.S.A.?____________employees.
10. About how many non-administrative employees does your firm employ worldwide?
___________employees.
11. Please estimate the approximate total sales of your firm last year: $____________________.
12. Please state your current title in the firm: _______________________.
13. How long have you been working for your current firm? _____________ years.
14. Your opinions are important to us. Feel free to give us any comments that you may have:

As a token of appreciation, we will be happy to share with you the summary of the research findings.
Please indicate your email address where you would like to receive the summary report:
___________________________________________________________________.
Thank you so much! Your opinions are important to us.

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION (CIBER)
A National Resource Center Designated by the U.S. Department of Education

APPENDIX B. ITEM INTER-CORRELATIONS
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

8

9
10
11
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Items
We commit resources to acquire
new knowledge from our key
supplier.
We commit resources to understand
our key supplier's processes.
We invest in training our employees
to make better use of knowledge of
our key supplier.
My firm’s IT system is compatible
with our key supplier’s IT system.
My firm’s IT system is aligned with
our key supplier’s.
My firm and our key supplier have
invested in our IT systems to make
them interoperable.
Both my firm and our key supplier
work together to integrate our IT
systems.
IT advances for supply chain
communication system are well
aligned between my firm and our
key supplier in order to achieve the
best supply chain performance.
Supplier Environment –
Stable/Volatile
Supplier Environment –
Certain/Uncertain
Supplier Environment –Predictable/
Unpredictable
We believe that our operational
information about our key supplier
is accurate.
Overall, information regarding our
key supplier’s operations is
available to us in a timely manner.
The operational information we
have about our key supplier is
useful to improve our performance.
We have a good understanding of
the resource and capabilities of our
key supplier.
We believe that the strategic
information we have about our key
supplier is accurate.
The strategic information we have
about our key supplier is relevant to
our business.
If our firm required assistance, our
key supplier would do its best to
provide it.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

1.00
0.66

1.00

0.54

0.50

1.00

0.08

0.03

0.24

1.00

0.19

0.11

0.32

0.84

1.00

0.07

0.05

0.26

0.74

0.80

1.00

0.11

0.06

0.23

0.73

0.82

0.91

1.00

0.18

0.17

0.24

0.74

0.73

0.68

0.69

1.00

0.02

-0.29

-0.12

-0.04

-0.02

0.01

0.07

-0.03

1.00

-0.02

-0.31

-0.21

-0.16

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

-0.14

0.87

1.00

-0.04

-0.22

-0.15

-0.18

-0.14

0.04

-0.02

-0.13

0.63

0.63

1.00

0.20

0.19

0.13

0.25

0.33

0.20

0.13

0.30

-0.25

-0.32

-0.12

1.00

0.39

0.55

0.32

0.13

0.25

0.15

0.11

0.28

-0.16

-0.22

0.00

0.67

1.00

0.28

0.38

0.44

0.26

0.38

0.32

0.31

0.31

-0.16

-0.16

-0.07

0.29

0.53

1.00

0.31

0.55

0.31

0.22

0.27

0.16

0.11

0.23

-0.14

-0.19

-0.04

0.49

0.61

0.52

1.00

0.39

0.47

0.24

0.21

0.31

0.15

0.15

0.22

-0.13

-0.18

0.00

0.59

0.67

0.52

0.67

1.00

0.30

0.48

0.29

0.07

0.17

0.15

0.10

0.19

-0.18

-0.14

0.00

0.54

0.68

0.64

0.76

0.76

1.00

0.01

0.21

0.02

0.08

0.09

0.10

0.05

0.05

-0.26

-0.32

-0.08

0.58

0.50

0.15

0.31

0.26

0.27

112

1.00

19

20

21

22

23

113

#
19

20

21

22

23

Items
1
Our key supplier is interested
in our firm’s well being, not 0.23
just its own.
In times of difficulty (e.g.
shortages), our key supplier
0.16
has “gone out on a limb” for
us.
Our key supplier does not
have strong controls for
-0.27
unexpected events.
Our key supplier is not
capable of providing the key -0.31
item with consistent quality.
Our key supplier has the
technological capability to
-0.29
ensure stability in the supply
of the key item (reverse).

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

0.33

0.30

0.20

0.36

0.28

0.24

0.25

-0.11

-0.24

-0.12

0.62

0.58

0.29

0.38

0.46

0.41

0.68

1.00

0.27

0.15

0.18

0.28

0.24

0.21

0.24

-0.09

-0.12

-0.09

0.56

0.63

0.44

0.40

0.36

0.39

0.68

0.77

1.00

-0.47

-0.26

-0.17

-0.26

-0.12

-0.13

-0.17

0.27

0.27

0.31

-0.28

-0.46

-0.28

-0.41

-0.38

-0.37

-0.36

-0.39

-0.37

1.00

-0.45

-0.13

-0.12

-0.09

-0.01

-0.02

-0.16

0.30

0.22

0.26

-0.29

-0.40

-0.28

-0.43

-0.37

-0.36

-0.30

-0.19

-0.31

0.47

1.00

-0.49

-0.36

-0.12

-0.17

-0.06

-0.04

-0.11

0.46

0.46

0.32

-0.30

-0.44

-0.20

-0.43

-0.32

-0.34

-0.30

-0.29

-0.22

0.50

0.70

23

1.00

APPENDIX C. MODEL TEST RESULTS FOR SAMPLE SIZE OF 66
Table C-1. Structural Path Results
Control Variable
Only Model
Independent
Variables

Visibility

Theoretical Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Visibility
t-value
Control Variables
Supplier’s Market
Dynamism
t-value
Relationship Duration
t-value
Supplier’s
Substitutability
t-value
Goodwill Trust
t-value
R-square

Theoretical Variable
Only Model

Full Model

Perceived
Perceived
Perceived
Supplier Visibility Supplier Visibility Supplier
Risk
Risk
Risk
0.507**
6.176
0.201*
2.524

0.488**
4.317
0.197*
2.191
-0.489**
4.768

-0.316*
2.304

-0.267

0.265*

-0.074

0.240*

1.558

2.157
-0.330**
3.326

0.538

1.992
-0.314**
3.475

7%

-0.056

-0.028

0.522
-0.289**
2.587
37%

0.280
-0.111
0.995
43%

* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500
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35%

24%

35%
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Table C-2. Mediation Test Results

Independent Variables
Main Model Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Visibility
t-value
Control Variables
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
t-value
Relationship Duration
t-value
Supplier’s Substitutability
t-value
Goodwill Trust
t-value
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500

Perceived Supplier Risk as Dependent Variable
Without-Mediator
With Mediator
Full Mediation
Model
Model
Model
-0.289**
2.880
0.018
0.177

0.214*
2.045
-0.304**
3.468
-0.030
0.286
-0.223
1.911

-0.201
1.507
0.044
0.470
-0.224
1.304

-0.316*
2.304

0.217*
1.979
-0.299**
3.359
-0.018
0.176
-0.122
1.007

0.240*
1.992
-0.314**
3.475
-0.028
0.280
-0.111
0.995
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Table C-3. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator
Independent Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
t-value
Absorptive Capacity X Supplier's
Market Dynamism
t-value
R-square
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500

Paths to Visibility
Model 1
Model 2
0.488**
0.450**
4.317
4.614
0.197*
0.205**
2.191
2.579
-0.074
-0.175
0.538
1.557
-0.304*
35%

2.061
43%

Table C-4. Supplier's Market Dynamism as Moderator
Independent Variables
Absorptive Capacity
t-value
IT Integration
t-value
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
t-value
IT Integration X Supplier's
Market Dynamism
t-value
R-square
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500

Paths to Visibility
Model 1
Model 2
0.488**
0.501**
4.317
4.955
0.197*
0.160
2.191
1.697
-0.074
-0.102
0.538
0.832
-0.229
35%

1.264
40%
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Table C-5. Goodwill Trust as Moderator

Independent Variables
Visibility
t-value
Goodwill Trust
t-value
Visibility x Goodwill Trust
t-value
Supplier’s Market Dynamism
t-value
Relationship Duration
t-value
Supplier’s Substitutability
t-value
R-square
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
N = 66; Bootstrapping = 500

Paths to Perceived Supplier
Risk
Model 1
Model 2
-0.153
-0.316*
1.131
2.304
-0.111
-0.126
0.995
1.066
0.306
0.986
0.343**
0.240*
1.992
2.980
-0.289**
-0.314**
3.123
3.475
-0.028
-0.005
0.280
0.047
43%
49%
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